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Abstract
Maintaining computer security is an ever present problem in today’s increas-
ingly connected world. As computer architectures increase in complexity to support
the needs of ever more complex applications, it is becoming more difficult to protect
against misuse and attack. Software-based security monitoring mechanisms have been
implemented, however, these are circumventable, have slow time-to-detect, and de-
grade performance of the system being monitored. To overcome these shortcomings,
our research focuses on moving security-related monitoring mechanisms from software
to hardware.
This research explores how hardware-based primitives can be implemented to
perform security-related monitoring in real-time, offer better security, and increase
performance compared to software-based approaches. In doing this, we propose a
novel computing architecture, derived from a contemporary shared memory architec-
ture, that facilitates efficient security-related monitoring in real-time, while keeping
the monitoring hardware itself safe from attack. This architecture is flexible, allowing
security to be tailored based on the needs of the system. We have developed a number
of hardware-based primitives that fit into this architecture to provide a wide array
of monitoring capabilities. A number of these primitives provide capabilities, such as
multi-context monitoring and virtual memory introspection, that were not previously
possible at the hardware level. Not only does this allow for more robust security-
iv
related monitoring when compared to software-based approaches, it also allows the
security-related monitoring concepts presented in this research to be applied across a
broad range of computing environments.
A number of these primitives are implemented in the context of our architec-
ture. Experimentation with these prototypes validated our approach and demon-
strated real-time performance. However, due to the limitations of current computer
architectures, a number of the primitives could not be implemented. In these cases,
we describe what is needed for these concepts to be implemented and argue why
these primitives will function correctly. Therefore, this research shows that security-
related monitoring tasks can be moved from software to hardware in a way that se-
curity, system performance/usability, and time-to-detect are all improved compared
to software-based methods.
v
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Exploring Hardware-based Primitives to Enhance
Parallel Security Monitoring in a Novel Computing
Architecture
I. Introduction
A
dding certain functional primitives to current computer architectures will
leverage previously unavailable knowledge of system state at the hardware
level. This allows for increased computer security with less performance overhead
than previously proposed methods, while still maintaining strong security for the se-
curity mechanisms themselves. In this paper, we discuss our research that has allowed
us to make such claims.
1.1 Background and Problem Overview
Computer security is an ever present problem in today’s connected world. Every
year the reported instances of vulnerabilities in software grows and there seems to be
no end in sight [10]. The computing industry is aware of this and tries to implement
good programming practices, create safer programming constructs, as well as modify
how operating systems interact with the processes they coordinate. However, pro-
grammers are only human and are bound to make mistakes, no matter how strong
their resolve is to create non-exploitable code. Furthermore, as code becomes more
complex to solve increasingly complicated problems, vulnerabilities are more difficult
to prevent. This is in large part due to abilities afforded by the current computer
1
architecture paradigm - the primary design goal of which has been to improve per-
formance, not security. As such, hardware in recent years has begun to implement
changes to contemporary processor architectures that help to prevent certain security
exploits such as buffer overflows. However, current hardware-based security tech-
niques implemented in commercial processors are far from exhaustive solutions. As
a result, we need more robust security in today’s computing systems, but increased
security introduces a number of problems.
Adding security to a system does not come for free. Increased security typically
increases cost in terms of performance as well as usability. Moreover, there is usually
a distinct inverse relationship between performance/usability and the level of security
a system can provide. That is, a system with a high level of security does so at the
expense of lower performance, and vice versa. This is due to the sharing of resources
between security-related and non-security-related tasks. Thus a shift towards using
dedicated hardware to monitor another processor for security purposes is needed.
A large amount of research has already been conducted on security mechanisms
that utilize dedicated hardware - much of which is described in Chapter II. These
mechanisms all leverage hardware to process state information, but may differ in how
such state information is gathered. Some hardware monitors gather state information
in software, whereas others gather system state at the hardware level. Each way of
gathering state has its advantages and disadvantages which result from the level of
the abstraction that the gathered state information corresponds to. State information
at the hardware level is seen only as instructions, data, and control signals. As such,
2
state gathered at the hardware level corresponds to the lowest level of abstraction.
State information gathered at the software level corresponds to a higher abstraction
level. It is this higher level of abstraction that allows software-based techniques to
better correlate the gathered state to what the monitored code is actually doing,
putting the monitored state into context easier. Context can be and is determined for
state information gathered at the hardware level as well, however, it is more difficult
to do so than using software-based methods.
Hardware-based security monitors that gather state at the hardware level can
gather state in real-time (as it is implemented in hardware), but due to the lack of
abstraction at this level, it is difficult to determine the context of the state information
gathered (i.e., what the state actually means in relation to the system). This typically
limits the kinds of monitoring that these mechanisms can perform as well as limits
the environments they are normally applied to. Hardware-based security monitors
that gather state information at the software level retrieve state information that can
inherently contain more contextual information. As a result, such mechanisms can be
applied in more complex computing environments. However, this higher abstraction
level (i.e., greater context) is gained by the monitoring software being tightly coupled
to the code it is monitoring. This tends to decrease performance of the monitored
system as well as decrease the security of the monitoring system/mechanism itself,
however.
3
1.2 Research Goals
Our research specifically targets the aforementioned issues by exploring ways
in which we can alter the currently accepted computer architecture model in an ef-
fort to increase computer security. This is accomplished by breaking through the
limitations that current computing architectures impose by providing new methods
by which useful system state information can be revealed and processed in parallel,
enabling real-time security-related monitoring. We have developed a novel computing
architecture derived from a contemporary shared memory multiprocessor model that
provides for the implementation of a number of functional primitives in hardware that
we leverage to be able to provide such capabilities while maintaining compatibility
with the current computing model.
To help facilitate better overall system security, we intend to increase the se-
curity of the monitoring hardware itself. By protecting the monitoring hardware, we
can ensure the correct operation of the monitoring hardware to a greater degree than
software-based monitoring methods. We plan to accomplish this by tightly coupling
the monitoring hardware to the hardware executing the monitored code in order to
gather context-rich state information, rather than coupling the monitoring software to
the software being monitored. This allows the monitoring system to remain as trans-
parent to the monitored system as possible. Consequently, we minimize the attack
surface of the monitoring hardware itself, reducing the chance that the monitoring
system can be compromised [38].
4
Monitoring with dedicated hardware allows code to be monitored parallel as it
executes on the monitored processor, which should enable a real-time security moni-
toring capability. Additionally, as we intend to keep software coupling to an absolute
minimum, we believe little to no added overhead will be imposed on the system com-
pared to systems that couple the monitoring software to the monitored code more
tightly. As a result, no more than a minimal impact on the system’s usability would
likely occur.
1.3 Contributions
In working towards our research goals, we make a number of contributions.
They are as follows:
• Developed a novel, security-oriented computing architecture which is flexible,
secure, and extensible. The architecture is specifically designed to allow context-
rich state information to be gathered, while keeping the monitoring hardware
as secure as possible.
• Created a categorization of monitoring system security. This benefitted our
research when designing our architecture to provide the best balance of security
and capabilities for the monitoring hardware.
• Designed a number of functional primitives that fit into the architecture. All
primitives are based in hardware and can provide monitoring in real-time. It
should also be mentioned that many of the primitives are complementary to
each other and can be implemented together in varying combinations. Thus,
5
security can be be tailored to a particular application’s needs. The primitives
are briefly described below.
Multi-context Hardware Monitors: This primitive allows the monitoring
hardware to be able to discern between different processes executing on
the monitored processor - a capability previously not possible at the hard-
ware level. As a result, hardware-based monitoring mechanisms can be
implemented in a broader range of computing environments.
Execution Policy Enforcement Module: This primitive prevents malicious
code from executing. Although some computing architectures contain this
capability, this primitive can add such a capability to processors that do
not natively support it.
Peripheral Access Control: This primitive ensures that processes do not ac-
cess system devices that they were not originally intended to access.
Asymmetrically Partitioned Main Memory: This primitive allows mem-
ory to be shared in an asymmetric manner. This provides the monitoring
system with visibility into the physical memory space of the monitored
processor, while preventing the monitored processor from having visibility
into the monitoring system’s memory space.
MMU Co-opting: This primitive provides the monitoring hardware with vis-
ibility into the virtual memory space of the process that is currently ex-
ecuting on the monitored processor - a capability previously not possible
6
at the hardware-level. As a result, certain forms of monitoring, such as
invariant checking, can be performed on both user-level and kernel-level
processes.
Monitoring Using Multiple MMUs: This primitive enables the same capa-
bilities as MMU co-opting, however, it can also provide visibility into the
virtual memory space of processes not currently executing. This provides
for a number of novel security-related capabilities, such as trusted process
execution (throughout the process’ entire runtime) and real-time deadlock
detection, among others.
• A number of the primitives were implemented to show proof of concept.
While the aforementioned contributions are physical results of our research, we also
make a number of contributions to the security-related monitoring field in general.
They are as follows:
Time-to-Detect: Our primitives can provide for real-time security monitoring. As a
result, the primitives can provide improved time-to-detect compared to software-
based methods.
Hardness of Monitor in the Presence of Malicious Code: The security of the
monitoring system itself can be ensured, to a good degree, in the event that the
monitored system has been compromised by malicious code. As a result, the
monitoring system can continue to function in such a case.
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Types of Inputs to the Monitoring System: We devised new ways to gather state
information at the hardware level. This increases the types of inputs (at the
hardware level) to the monitoring system over previous methods, resulting in
more robust security-related monitoring capabilities.
Range of Monitoring Granularity: Our primitives can allow monitoring granu-
larity ranging from the individual instruction level to the process level. As a
result, this research increases the range of monitoring granularity that can be
provided via hardware-based mechanisms. This allows our primitives to provide
security policy compliance monitoring (SPCM)in a broad range of computing
environments.
1.4 Document Layout
This chapter covered the general area of our research, what problems we are
trying to solve, and why it is important to do so. Additionally, we outline our re-
search goals and detail our contributions. Chapter II describes work done by other
researchers in the same or related fields that we used as a basis in forming our own
work. We present the actual thesis statement, research methodologies, and theories
behind the implementation in Chapter III. Chapter IV covers in detail the actual
implementation of our work, while Chapter V presents the testing methodology, any
applicable simulations, the results, and analysis of the implementation. The conclud-
ing remarks as well as future work areas our research has opened are presented in
Chapter VI. Appendices are also included at the end of the document and contain
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information not appropriate for the main document such as code created through our
research efforts and tutorials for our development environment.
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II. Related Research Exploration
T
his chapter presents the results of research that we found useful in conduct-
ing our own exploration. We begin by presenting work that classifies and
describes the different forms of intrusion detection (ID). These concepts are then ex-
panded by presenting the different ways intrusion detection systems (IDS) have been
implemented. The section concludes with descriptions of the various hardware-based
security mechanisms that have been proposed thus far.
2.1 Classes of Attack
In order to help describe the various monitoring mechanisms we propose in this
document, it is useful to understand some of the various forms of malicious attacks
and the vehicles employed. While there are countless forms of attack, we attempt to
summarize the different classes of attacks in this section. This is not meant to be an
exhaustive list, but rather a number of attacks that are useful when describing our
work that can be referenced when needed.
2.1.1 Viruses, Worms, and Trojans. CACI International provides a break-
down of various types of computer security threats in [9]. [9] defines viruses as a form
of malicious software that attaches itself to other software within a system. Viruses
are not self-propagating across machines, and thus have no means by which to spread
to another system unless copied to another location by some means external to the
virus itself. Worms are standalone programs that perform some malicious function
within a system. Worms, unlike viruses, have the ability to propagate themselves to
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other systems via a network. Trojans are malicious software masquerading as useful
software. Trojans can be implemented as a worm (self propagating) or as a virus that
is attached to a piece of software prior to distribution. While viruses, worms, and
trojans are all slightly different, they are all related in that they actively execute code
in an unintended fashion. They act as the basic tools to perform malicious activities
within a system.
2.1.2 Rootkits. The formal definition of a rootkit reads, “A rootkit is a set
of software tools intended to conceal running processes, files or system data from the
operating system” [57]. Although rootkits can be used for non-malicious purposes,
we are only concerned with the malicious use of rootkits. Rootkits are typically used
by attackers to keep “root” access to a computer system - the highest privilege level
- and hide their activities in order to prevent detection by a system administrator.
Rootkits are typically installed onto a computer via a security vulnerability and are
very noticeable the first time the attacker gains root level access. Once installed, the
rootkit cleans evidence of its initial entry and provides an exploit (i.e., a backdoor
in many cases) to the system using common commands that have been modified into
trojans. These backdoors allow the attacker to continue to access the system without
being noticed [7]. As rootkits can provide a means for an attacker to have complete
control over an entire computer system while making detection difficult, rootkits have
become regarded as highly dangerous, making rootkit defense a very active area of
research.
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2.1.3 Timing-based Attacks. Timing-based attacks are any type of malicious
attack whose operation is intended to focus on a vulnerability associated with the
timing of particular events within a system. For example, some detection systems
only check for malicious activity at specific time intervals. It is possible for an attacker
to target the window of time where the code is not being monitored. Moreover, such
a vulnerability makes it possible for any malicious software used to be removed and
all traces of illegitimate activity to be erased before the monitor is ever invoked [46].
However, for such an attack to occur, the attacker/malicious software must know
when a particular system is vulnerable at a certain point in time in order to exploit
that vulnerability.
2.1.4 Relocation Attacks. A relocation attack relocates the malicious code to
avoid detection. Relocation is done typically to somewhere that cannot be monitored.
For example, malicious code may be detected in memory, so the malicious code is
engineered in such a way that it executes from within a processor’s cache [46]. This
type of attack seems particularly difficult to implement, but it is a possible threat
nonetheless.
2.2 Intrusion Detection Taxonomies & Categorizations
While there are many varying definitions of intrusion detection, we consider
intrusion detection to be the identification of abnormal system behavior given an idea
of what good and/or bad system behavior should be. Despite this singular definition,
there are numerous forms that intrusion detection can take, and a variety of systems
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which operate differently and to different degrees. In order to help others understand
the key differences between these different intrusion detection systems, as well as the
general concepts of intrusion detection and security policy compliance monitoring,
work has been done to classify the features of such systems proposed thus far. The
results pertinent to our research are described below.
2.2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems: A Survey and Taxonomy. In [4], Axels-
son provides a comprehensive breakdown of intrusion detection principles which he
uses to survey and classify numerous intrusion detection systems that have progressed
to the prototype stage of development. He asserts that in order to develop methods to
detect intrusions, one must first know what to look for. This is not as easy a problem
as one might first think, as Axelsson attests to. He points out that not only are some
threats unknown (and hence unforeseeable), but also that even known threats can be
difficult to distinguish from what is considered normal operation. Furthermore, it is
never entirely certain what the source of an attack will be, whether it is an assailant
hacking into a network, a user within the network that is abusing privileges, etc.
Perhaps one of the largest problems when implementing an IDS is the lack of useful
information provided to the IDS.
Knowing the problems associated with designing intrusion detection systems,
Axelsson produced a taxonomy of intrusion detection by generally characterizing in-
trusion detection principles into two main classes: 1) anomaly-based detection and
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2) signature-based detection. This taxonomy, however, can be extended to include a
principle known as specification-based detection, first described by Ko in [31].
• Anomaly-based Detection: According to Axelsson, anomaly-based detection
does not look at the the actual intrusion itself, but rather the reaction of the
process in question to an intrusion [4]. It operates on the assumption that an
intrusion will produce abnormal behavior within a system, and that the abnor-
mal behavior can be considered suspicious. Thus, an anomaly-based intrusion
detector must know what constitutes abnormal behavior, as well as at what
point to deem abnormal behavior as an intrusion.
To determine what is considered normal behavior, Axelsson breaks down anomaly
detection into two types: 1) self-learning and 2) programmed. In the first type
of anomaly detection, the process under scrutiny is run in a safe environment for
an extended period of time. As the process executes, the IDS gathers statistics
on that process’ operation in order to build a model of normal operation for that
process. The system is then placed into use and monitored, signaling a viola-
tion when an event outside of the previously gathered behavior data occurs. The
second type of anomaly detection depends on a system administrator, designer,
and/or user to teach the system specifically what constitutes abnormal behavior
and how to signal a security violation. Thus the user, rather than the system
itself in the self-learning case, determines what constitutes abnormal behavior.
14
• Signature-based Detection: Signature-based detection (also known as misuse
detection) relies on the user to provide a model of an intrusive event to the
intrusion detection system. A signature-based detector will look for known
specific clues left behind from an intrusive process in order to determine if
an intrusion has occurred. With that said, signature-based detectors detect
intrusions irrespective of what the normal behavior for the system is. Thus,
even normal behavior can flag a security violation if such behavior matches a
provided model of illicit activity. As such, the models used for a signature-based
detector must be very precise so as to ensure low false positive rates.
Since signature-based detectors rely on models of known threats, intrusion de-
tection systems using this principle can only be programmed to know what to
look for. This can be done via state modeling, expert-system, string matching,
or a simple rule-based method. State modeling consists of a number of states
occurring within a system which indicates whether an intrusion has taken place.
An expert-system reasons about the security state of the system given rules that
describe intrusive behavior. String matching is an inflexible, yet simple means
to detect intrusions via comparing substring text received by the system. The
simple rule-based approach is a less complex version of an expert-system that
often leads to a faster execution.
• Specification-based: Specification-based detection attempts to merge the high
detection rate of signature-based detection with the ability to detect novel at-
tacks of anomaly-based detection [20]. In systems with explicitly defined security
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policies, specification-based detection can be used to detect any deviations from
that security policy. At the time Axelsson’s taxonomy was created, specification-
based detection had not been widely accepted. As noted by Williams in [59],
this is due to a lack of clearly defined security policies at the time, although
more recently that is beginning to change.
Axelsson points out that most intrusion detection systems studied fall into more
than one category. He claims this is not due to his taxonomy being vague, but rather
that many intrusion detection systems created thus far employ multiple intrusion
detection principles. This taxonomy also makes evident two orthogonal concepts
in intrusion detection: 1) anomaly versus signature and 2) programmed versus self-
learning. As Williams notes in [59], with the inclusion of specification-based detection,
the first concept must be modified to anomaly versus signature versus specification.
Axelsson then goes on to classify intrusion detection systems by what type of
intrusion they most readily detect. From this, three forms of intrusion are derived:
1. Well-known Intrusions: Intrusions that exhibit a static and well defined pattern.
These generally take little work to detect.
2. Generalizable Intrusions: Intrusions that allow for some degree of variability in
how they are executed. These often exploit a general flaw or set of flaws in a
process rather than than a specific vulnerability.
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3. Unknown Intrusions: Intrusions that have a very weak coupling to a specific
flaw or an extremely general flaw. Thus, the intrusion detection system does
not necessarily know what to expect.
Axlesson ends with a taxonomy of system characteristics. This is very similar to
some characteristics described in Kuperman’s Ph.D. work in [33]. One characteristic
that is of importance to this research, but not present in Kuperman’s work (See
Subsection 2.2.2 for the other characteristics) is processing granularity. The processing
granularity of an intrusion detection system describes how much and/or how fast data
is processed by the intrusion detection system. The two main categories are batch
granularity and continuous granularity. Batch granularity processes data in chunks.
This helps to decrease overhead of the intrusion detection system, but can add to the
time to detect. Conversely, continuous granularity processes all data as it is produced.
This can impose a large overhead to the system being monitored, but generally has
better time-to-detect compared to a similarly configured intrusion detection system
using batch processing granularity. Since this affects the effectiveness and speed of
detection, careful attention must be paid to this characteristic in our research.
2.2.2 A Categorization of CSM Systems and The Impact on The Design of Au-
dit Sources. Kuperman presents a characterization of computer security monitors
(CSM) in [33]. His work includes characteristics of such computer security monitors
which are of importance to our work. Two characteristics - the goal of detection and
the timeliness of detection - were found to be of importance to Williams’ previous
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work in [59]. As our research is based heavily on Williams’ research, these character-
istics are also of importance to our research and are described below. Furthermore,
for our work we add a new characteristic to these - Monitoring System Security - and
is also described below.
2.2.2.1 Goal of Detection. In order to categorize security monitoring
systems, Kuperman first asks the question For what security purpose is this system
monitoring behavior? To answer this question, he identifies a number of major areas
of focus within the computer security monitoring field. These areas are described
below:
• Detection of Attacks: Detects attempts to exploit a specific vulnerability in a
computer system. Attacks can be in the form of a virus, trojan, etc. and are
intended to cause harm to the system or use it in an illegitimate manner.
• Detection of Intrusion: Relies on the notion of legitimate users of a specific
computer system. Intrusions can be external to the system (e.g., over a network
connection) or internal to the system (i.e., from the system itself but by an
unauthorized user). This is also known as an intrusion detection system.
• Detection of Misuse: Similar to detection of intrusion, however, the misuse being
detected is by an authorized user of the system. Thus, no intrusion is committed
nor detectable, but illegitimate actions are detected.
• Computer Forensics: Gathering of data to reconstruct previously occurred ac-
tivities on a system. This could be used to determine if, when, and how an
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attack, intrusion, or misuse occurred, but can also be used for other legitimate
actions such as message verification or the tracking of changes made by the
computer’s administrator.
Our research primarily focuses on the detection of attacks, intrusion, and misuse.
Although our work can also apply to computer forensics applications, that is outside
the scope of our research for the time being.
2.2.2.2 Timeliness of Detection. Another way Kuperman categorizes
CSM systems is by the timeliness of detection. He proposes a view of the overall
system as an ordered set of events. Thus, detection times are described in logical
time, rather than temporal time. Using Kuperman’s notation, the set of all events
taking place in a system is denoted as E. The set of suspect events B is a subset such
that
B ⊆ E (2.1)
and there exists events a, b, and c such that
a,b,c ∈ E (2.2)
b ∈ B (2.3)
The time at which event x occurs is denoted by tx. The notation x −→ y denotes
that the event y is causally dependent on the event x. Unless otherwise noted, we
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assume the dependence of events occurs in alphabetical order as
a −→ b −→ c (2.4)
ta < tb < tc (2.5)
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that a may not necessarily be the cause of b
and so on. Lastly, the detection function, D(x), is used to determine the truth of the
statement x ∈ B.
Using the terminology mentioned above, Kuperman describes four main timeli-
ness categories in his CSM categorization. These categories are described below:
• Real-time Detection: Detection of a bad event b takes place while the system
is operating and is further restricted to mean that detection of b occurs before
any events that are dependent on b take place. As a result, real-time detection
requires the ordering
tb < tD(b) < tc (2.6)
• Near Real-time Detection: Detection of b occurs within some finite time δ of
the occurrence of b. Thus, near real-time detection requires the ordering
|tb − tD(b)| ≤ δ (2.7)
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• Periodic: Event records are analyzed by a security system once every time
interval p where p is ordinarily on the order of minutes or hours. Furthermore,
the detection must take place before the next set of event records is analyzed in
order to prevent an increasing backlog of events causing the security system to
fail. This results in the ordering
tD(b) ≤ tb + 2 ∗ p (2.8)
• Retrospective: Detection of bad events takes place outside of any particular
time bounds. Analysis operations typically take place using archived events.
The CoProcessor Intrusion Detection System (CuPIDS) architecture that our
work is based upon improves the detection rate over a standard uniprocessor intru-
sion detection system (StUPIDS) for the same detection function D(x) by being able
to perform detection within Kuperman’s real-time detection category [59]. This is
due to security monitoring occurring in parallel as the monitored code executes. As
our functional primitives perform security monitoring in a similarly parallel manner,
they can perform detection within Kuperman’s real-time detection category as well.
However, our more hardware-centric methods reduce the detection function’s reliance
on software-based methods for process-monitor communications. Not only does this
guarantee real-time detection, but also provides an improvement in time-to-detect
and detection efficiency over CuPIDS.
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2.2.3 Monitoring System Security. A monitoring system can be categorized
according to how it provides security for a system, however, there has been no cat-
egorization for the security of the monitoring system itself. While overlooked, the
security of the monitoring system itself is critical, as the entire system can become
vulnerable to attack if the monitoring system itself is compromised. As such, we add
our own categorization of monitoring system security to what Kuperman has already
proposed in [33]. There are eight levels of monitoring system security ranging from
least secure to most secure, each of which is described below.
• Open: The monitored system has knowledge of and explicitly coordinates and
shares state information with the monitor. No security mechanisms are present
to protect the monitor from being compromised. This is the worst case. Moni-
tors at this security level tend to be uniprocessor host-based intrusion detection
systems which are discussed in Section 2.3.
• Soft Security: The monitored system has knowledge of and explicitly coordinates
and shares state information with the monitor. The monitor is secured only by
software techniques. The monitor can be compromised without having to first
compromise the monitored system. As with the open security level, monitors
with this security level tend to be uniprocessor host-based intrusion detection
systems which are discussed in Section 2.3.
• Passive Security: The monitored system is not necessarily aware of the moni-
tor. Any vulnerability to the monitor is by virtue of how it actually performs
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monitoring. As such, information about how the monitor actually operates on
gathered state data must be known. Most network IDSs can be considered pas-
sively secure as they only monitor network traffic, however, the network traffic
can contain information that can actually disable the network IDS when it is
processed. Such IDSs are discussed in Section 2.4.
• Self Security: The monitored system has knowledge of and explicitly coordinates
and shares state information with the monitor. By virtue of how the monitor
operates, it provides itself with security. Thus, the monitored system must first
be compromised before the monitor itself can be compromised. Software-based
techniques can also be used to enhance the security of a self secure monitor.
CuPIDS presented in [59] and discussed in 2.6.3.1 is one such system at this
monitoring system security level.
• Loose-hard Security: The monitored system has knowledge of and explicitly
coordinates and shares state information with the CSM. Dedicated hardware
mechanisms or a combination of hardware and software techniques exist to pro-
tect key portions of the CSM from being compromised. Hardware-based return
address stacks (presented in [34]) are an example of a type of monitor with this
level of security and are discussed further in Section 2.7.1.
• Semi-hard Security: The monitored system has very little or no knowledge of
the monitor. As such, the monitor can not be executing on the same processor
core as the software being monitored and hardware must be used for commu-
nications. The monitored system explicitly coordinates with the monitor via
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mechanisms like unmaskable interrupts, but is kept to a minimum. The mon-
itored system’s state information is implicitly communicated to the monitor.
The monitor cannot be compromised via the system being monitored, but it
can be worked around if code controlling synchronization signals to the moni-
toring is altered (i.e., the monitor will not know when or how to monitor). If
this occurs, the monitor can still operate, albeit in a diminished capacity. This
is the monitoring system security level that our own work specifically targets.
• Strict-hard Security: The monitored system has very limited or no knowledge of
the monitoring system. As such, the monitor can not be executing on the same
processor core as the software being monitored and hardware must be used for
communications. The monitor only observes the operation of the system and
has to know when and where to gather specific state information. As such, the
operation of the monitor has no dependence on the monitored system. Only
a system admin can explicitly communicate with the monitor via a dedicated
hardware path such as a communications (COMM) port that only the moni-
tor has access to. CoPilot (presented in [46]) and the Independent Auditors
(presented in [40]) are two such systems at this CSM security level. They are
discussed further in Section 2.6.2.
• Complete Security: This is the ideally secure case. The monitoring system has
no contact with the outside world, hence it is self defeating as the system would
be completely unusable (i.e., an impenetrable lead box).
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While each level of monitoring system security is generally considered more
secure than the previous, in many cases there tends to be a tradeoff between the
security of the monitor and the ease by which state information can be gathered for
monitoring purposes. For example, we consider soft security to allow for easier state
retrieval since a monitor with soft security tends to closely couple the monitoring soft-
ware to the software it is monitoring. Semi-hard security can be considered as having
more difficulty gathering state information than monitors with soft security because
the monitoring software is completely independent of the software it is monitoring.
It should be noted that increased difficulty in gathering state information does not
necessarily translate into less overall monitoring functionality as monitoring systems
with strict-hard security can provide monitoring that soft-secure monitoring systems
cannot. However, there becomes a point where the amount of security actually ham-
pers the kinds of monitoring that can be performed. We consider this point to be at
the strict-hard security level. As a result, our work specifically targets the semi-hard
security level as it provides the monitoring system with the most security while still
allowing for some explicit communication - which aids in gathering context-rich state
information - used to synchronize the monitor with the monitored system - a critical
ability for our parallel monitoring techniques.
2.3 Uniprocessor-based Host Intrusion Detection
Host-based intrusion detection systems were the first form of intrusion detection.
Some examples include Haystack, Tripwire, NIDES, Janus, and IDIOT presented in [1,
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18, 27, 32, 52], respectively. Host-based intrusion detection systems are characterized
by the fact that the intrusion detection system executes on the same hardware as
the code that it monitors. In traditional (i.e., earlier) host-based IDSs, the IDS was
integrated into the host operating system (OS) or other software being monitored.
This close coupling of the IDS and the code that it monitors is the source of both
its greatest strength as well as its greatest weakness. As monitoring code executes
on the same hardware as the production code, a host-based IDS allows the easiest
access into “context-rich” system state and audit data. However, if an intrusion does
actually occur, the intrusion detection system itself is made vulnerable to attack due
to its integration with the production software. If the IDS is compromised, the result
of such an attack may not even be detectable, leaving a false sense of system security.
As a result, most host-based intrusion detection systems fit into either the open or
soft monitoring system security levels.
Overall host performance as well as IDS efficiency are also affected by the mon-
itor and production code sharing hardware resources. This is due to interleaving
execution of the production code and the monitoring code because only one process
can be executing on a uniprocessor at any given time. As a result, multiple processes
may be scheduled to execute after an intrusion occurs, allowing the malicious code
time to damage the system before the monitoring process can execute. Additionally,
granularity is reduced in some cases as the previous scenario also allows for certain
types of attacks to erase all traces of their existence prior to the monitor executing,
rendering the intrusion completely undetectable [59].
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More recently, host-based intrusion detection systems have seen a resurgence
in popularity. One such effort is the BlueBox system presented by Chari and Chang
in [11]. BlueBox is a policy-driven host-based IDS. Rather than specifically monitor
an executing process, BlueBox modifies the core OS of the system such that every
system call must first be checked with a binary rule file before it can be invoked. This
ensures that no illegitimate system calls can be made by a process unless it specifically
has been given permission in its execution policy. As such, every process requires its
own set of rules and the security policy effectiveness is reliant on how well the policy
is defined by the system administrator creating the policy.
2.4 Network-based Intrusion Detection
Network-based intrusion detection systems have also been an active area of re-
search. They are characterized by analyzing network traffic for known attacks. Details
of such examples can be found in [6, 12, 13, 22, 35, 53, 58]. Whereas host-based intru-
sion detection systems attempt to protect only one system, a single network intrusion
detection system can protect an entire group of systems from attacks. Network IDSs
are usually placed prior to a gateway to a network, but distributed network IDSs
have been implemented for more complex networks. This also means that unlike
host-based systems, the intrusion detection system executes in different hardware, as
only network traffic is monitored. This keeps the monitoring hardware separate from
what is being protected, thus most network intrusion detection systems would seem
to fit best into the strict-hard security level. Despite this, however, it has been proven
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that a umber of network IDSs can be defeated by sending malformed packets and/or
particular packet streams across the network which causes the detection mechanism
to fail when such packets are analyzed [47]. As a result, many network IDSs only
passively secure. Additionally, the separation of the hardware from what is being
monitored also traditionally makes the implementation of network IDS easier and
more scalable than host IDSs. This is because a network IDS can simply be placed on
the network prior to the gateway to the network being protected, whereas a host IDS
has to be integrated within a system and correctly interact with the entire system. It
is this better scalability and ease of implementation that have made network-based
intrusion detection popular in recent years.
Due to the ease of prototyping, using Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA)
to implement network-based intrusion detection systems makes up a large portion of
the research in the network IDS field. As network-based IDSs only analyze network
traffic, however, detection methods are limited primarily to signature-based detection.
Not only does this limit the effectiveness of network-based ID, but this unfortunately
means that much of the research into network-based intrusion detection systems,
including those utilizing FPGAs, has mostly been limited to increasing the speed of
pattern matching algorithms, which implement signature-based detection. This is due
to having to keep up with ever increasing network transmission rates. Thus, there has
not been much development into novel intrusion detection methods within this area of
research. Additionally, the increasing use of encryption when transmitting data over
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the internet is making network-based ID ever more difficult, causing a resurgence in
host-based intrusion detection [11].
2.5 Virtual Machine Monitor-based Intrusion Detection
A virtual machine monitor (VMM) is an abstraction layer interposed between
an operating system and the underlying hardware that supports it. The purpose of a
VMM is to mimic the interface between the OS and hardware so that the VMM can
monitor and control how an OS interacts with hardware. This allows the VMM to
treat an entire OS as a separate thread of execution, thus transparently enabling the
execution of multiple operating systems on the same hardware simultaneously and
independently.
A few attempts have been made thus far to leverage the simultaneous and
seemingly independent environment that VMMs can provide. Livewire, proposed by
Garfinkel et al. in [17], and ISIS, proposed by Litty in [37], are two such efforts. Both
systems treat the intrusion detection mechanism as a guest OS executing “simulta-
neously” with the host operating system on top of the VMM layer. The VMM layer
serves as a common interface from which the guest OS can view state information of
the host OS. According to Garfinkel, such an intrusion detection architecture com-
bines the main advantages of both host-based and network-based intrusion detection
systems - good visibility into the host’s state, while maintaining the security of the
intrusion detection mechanism.
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While VMM based systems can leverage these advantages to some extent, draw-
backs still remain. First and foremost is the fact that the so called independence
afforded by a VMM is almost entirely software-based, requiring the host and guest
operating systems to have hooks into the VMM. Thus if the host operating system
is compromised, the VMM as well as the intrusion detection system can potentially
be compromised. Work done by King et al. has even resulted in a method known
as SubVirt which implements a virtual machine-based rootkit (VMBR) [28]. Since a
VMM already has more permissions than the OS it is protecting, a VMBR could be
used to compromise not only the OS being monitored, but the VMM-based IDS as
well. Another drawback to VMM-based IDSs is due to the VMM multiplexing the
execution of multiple operating systems on the same hardware. As such, currently
proposed VMM-based intrusion detection systems are not truly parallel in nature.
Lastly, using a VMM partitions hardware utilization between any operating systems
as well as the VMM itself. This can impose a large overhead when implementing a
VMM-based intrusion detection system, and may make current proposals impractical
due to an overall degradation in system performance.
2.6 Coprocessor-based Intrusion Detection
The goal of coprocessor-based intrusion detection, like VMM-based intrusion de-
tection presented in Section 2.5, is to combine the visibility afforded by uniprocessor-
based host intrusion detection while executing the intrusion detection system in a
parallel and secure manner - the main difference being the use of a dedicated copro-
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cessor to execute the IDS on hardware independent of the hardware/software being
monitored. Coprocessor-based intrusion detection architectures can take many forms
but are typically considered a form of host-based IDS as the coprocessor resides within
the system that it is protecting (this is not a requirement). Work done on coprocessor-
based intrusion detection is an active area of research, and represents the current state
of the art in the intrusion detection field.
A handful of prototype coprocessor-based intrusion detection systems have been
implemented to date. As certain coprocessor-based IDS implementations have some
commonalities, we break up existing implementations into the following three groups
described below.
• Cryptographic Coprocessors: These co-processors protect data by encrypting
and decrypting information being transmitted between system devices, the CPU,
and memory. Thus, if the data is intercepted somehow, the content cannot be
compromised. These devices technically do not perform any intrusion detection
tasks, but rather they ensure data integrity.
• Add-in Coprocessors: Add-in coprocessors monitor the state of the main CPU
over a system bus such as the Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus.
We term IDSs based on this implementation as “loosely coupled”. This is be-
cause, although such an implementation can monitor system state, the mon-
itoring hardware does not reside at the same logical level as the main CPU,
thus it has no way to exert control of the CPU in the event of an intrusion.
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Furthermore, this also limits the amount of system state that can be gathered
to what a system bus can access.
• Integrated Coprocessors: Integrated coprocessors reside at the same physical
level as the processor it is monitoring. Thus we term them “tightly coupled”.
IDSs based on such an implementation have the ability to exert control over
the CPU being monitored. Additionally, these systems can access system state
information at the CPU level, thus they are not only limited to state infor-
mation that can be accessed via a system bus. Such systems have been en-
abled by the commercial availability of multi-processor systems in recent years,
as well as multi-core processors even more recently. However, little work has
been performed which explores how such architectures can be leveraged to aid
security-related monitoring.
Using this categorization, we describe previously implemented systems that are
relevant to our research below.
2.6.1 Cryptographic Coprocessors. While encryption is primarily involved in
intrusion prevention and protection of sensitive data, we still believe that it is worth
briefly mentioning. Implementing cryptographic coprocessors was the first foray into
using a processor other than the host processor for security related tasks, thus paving
the way for the development of co-processor based intrusion detection systems.
Cryptographic coprocessors can be used to encrypt and decrypt data sent within
a system. This can ensure that if the data is intercepted somehow, be it by a mali-
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cious process or through some other unintended means, the data cannot be accessed.
Many cryptographic coprocessors are implemented as what has been termed “secure
coprocessors”. These coprocessors have a dedicated CPU and access to dedicated
non-volatile storage that can store vital information such as cryptographic keys, sen-
sitive data, logs, etc. in a secure location. These coprocessors have been shown to be
able to handle digital rights management, copy protection, and various e-commerce
applications [39, 49, 74]. Research has also demonstrated that cryptographic copro-
cessors can even be used to make untrustable software, such as a standard standalone
OS, trustable [23].
More recent uses of cryptographic processors have been to create a secure bus
structure within the system. SECA, proposed by Coburn et al in [14], is an example
of such a system that implements a secure bus structure. The cryptographic copro-
cessor is used to encrypt all data sent within the system and only components with
the correct keys can decode that information. While this does not prevent an in-
trusion from occurring, it does ensure that data integrity is maintained in the event
of an intrusion. Commercial availability of such a capability has recently been real-
ized using the trusted platform module (TPM) [5]. Rather than be implemented as
an add-in card in a system, the TPM is integrated into the system’s motherboard
or Northbridge chip. Intel is using the TPM in its LaGrande security technology
to provide cryptographic-based security for protecting sensitive data and peripheral
communications that could lead to an intrusion [24].
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2.6.2 Loosely Coupled Monitoring Coprocessors.
2.6.2.1 Independent Auditors. Molina and Arbaugh present a method
of implementing independent auditors for file system integrity checking in [40]. As the
paper’s name implies, this system audits files to determine if an intrusion has taken
place. The auditing work is performed by a coprocessor implemented on a PCI card
in a standard personal computer architecture. The independent auditor (coprocessor)
logs all changes to the filesystem and performs all auditing calculations to determine
the integrity of the filesystem. Auditing is based on a policy file that defines what files
are to be checked and what parameters are to be verified. The independent auditor
periodically retrieves information pertaining to the files in question and checks them
with the known good values stored in the independent auditor’s local memory. The
independent auditor can also keep secure logs of process activity, measurements, or
other events. This can provide for a computer security forensics capability. The logs
are stored in a trusted state which is ensured by the periodic file system integrity
checks. If an integrity check results in an alarm, the data logged since the last known
trusted state verification is considered to not be trustable.
As this system is implemented as a coprocessor that independently accesses the
host system’s filesystem, all auditing tasks are done in parallel as the host processor
executes. This has little impact on host processor performance, however contention
for the system bus is increased. Information audited is limited to only what can be
gathered via the host processor’s filesystem. Additionally, as the auditing of files is
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periodic, the host is still potentially vulnerable to timing attacks. Despite this, by
the nature of how the independent auditor is implemented and how it accesses state
information, the IDS itself can be considered tight-hard secure.
2.6.2.2 CoPilot. The CoPilot system, developed by Petroni et al.
and presented in [46], is a coprocessor-based IDS that monitors the integrity of a
Linux-based kernel at runtime. This integrity monitoring is achieved by the copro-
cessor having visibility into the host processor’s physical memory space and looking
for changes that are indicative of malicious activity. In the case of the CoPilot sys-
tem, malicious activity is defined as the installation of known rootkits which can
compromise the security of the host processor and the OS.
According to Petroni, there are six requirements that a coprocessor must meet
in order to effectively monitor the integrity of a kernel at runtime:
1. Must have unrestricted memory access in order to view the host processor’s
entire memory space.
2. The monitoring process must be transparent to what is being monitored.
3. The coprocessor must operate independently of the processor that it is moni-
toring.
4. The coprocessor must have sufficient power to process a large number of oper-
ations on memory.
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5. Must contain enough memory resources to keep a consistent memory image of
a non-compromised host
6. Must be able to securely report the state of the system via the use of a dedicated
channel to an admin station.
In order to meet the above requirements, CoPilot uses a coprocessor that resides on
a peripheral component interface (PCI) card. In so doing, the coprocessor can only
receive data via the PCI bus. The PCI bus is afforded access to main memory through
the system’s memory controller which coordinates accesses made to main memory by
the CPU and peripherals residing on the system buses. This allows CoPilot to monitor
the production processor without there being any explicit communication between the
processors themselves. As such, the CoPilot system falls within the tight-hard security
category of our monitoring system security categorization.
Typically, for a device to access main memory, the device’s address must be
translated to a physical address in main memory that the device can then access.
Interestingly though, due to the personal computer-based architecture of CoPilot, the
PCI bus’ address space has a one-to-one mapping to main memory. This allows the
coprocessor to access main memory without the need to have the memory addresses
translated, thus reducing the overall overhead associated with the coprocessor mon-
itoring system memory. Once the coprocessor has access to main memory, it then
monitors specific memory locations for changes to certain invariants. Memory lo-
cations of interest include locations containing kernel text or jump tables of kernel
function pointers. As this does not look for specific symptoms of known rootkits,
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but rather uses anomaly-based detection, this method may detect some previously
unknown rootkits.
The CoPilot system does have some drawbacks, however. Most notably, CoPi-
lot can only monitor memory locations that correspond to fixed pages, limiting mon-
itoring to only those portions of the kernel hard-wired into physical memory. User
processes cannot be monitored due to the dynamic (non-fixed) nature of the virtual
memory subsystem employed in modern multi-programmed operating systems. Fur-
thermore, CoPilot can be circumvented with sophisticated relocation attacks as well
as timing attacks. This is due to the fact that CoPilot only monitors main memory
and only does so every 30 seconds. Monitoring can not be performed faster than every
30 seconds, as bus contention becomes a limiting factor.
While 30 seconds may seem like a small window of time, it is large for a pro-
cessor. For example, consider a superscalar host processor operating at a frequency
of 1GHz with an average of 2.5 instructions per clock (IPC) - a very conservative
configuration by today’s standards. Within a 30 second time frame on such a sys-
tem, 75 billion instructions on average will have executed! To put this in perspective,
the SQLSlammer worm that was one of the most devastating Internet attacks of all
time - it brought down 5 of the 13 Internet root nameservers - was only 376 bytes in
size [15]. Assuming an average instruction length of 32 bits (the targeted x86 archi-
tecture actually uses variable length instructions), SQLSlammer contained roughly
94 instructions. Even with loops in the code and other processes executing for a
portion of the CPU time, it can easily execute within the 75 billion instruction win-
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dow. Although, it would have been detected eventually, it would still have caused the
intended damage.
2.6.3 Tightly Coupled Monitoring Coprocessors.
2.6.3.1 CuPIDS. Williams’ paper is one of the more recent imple-
mentations of a coprocessor-based IDS [59]. Rather than use a coprocessor located
on a separate daughter card from the host CPU as with CoPilot and the independent
auditors system, CuPIDS leverages the uniform memory access (UMA) multiproces-
sor model to perform intrusion detection and security policy compliance monitoring
(SPCM). CuPIDS is implemented on a dual-processor system, although it can oper-
ate in any UMA-based multiprocessor/multicore system regardless of the number of
processors. A single instance of FreeBSD executes in a symmetric multiple processing
(SMP) fashion on the two cores, however the cores are leveraged by the OS in an
asymmetric fashion - one core for production processes and the other for monitoring
processes. As such, only one of the processors in the dual-processor system is available
to the user for executing production code.
The tightly coupled nature of CuPIDS provides it with a very powerful capability
- the monitoring CPU has access to virtual memory. As such CuPIDS can monitor
code executing in both the kernel space as well as the user space, whereas CoPilot can
only monitor code that resides in the kernel space (i.e., hard-wired pages). CuPIDS is
afforded this ability by the coprocessor being at the same logical level as the processor
executing the code being monitored. That is, the coprocessor in CuPIDS has all
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permissions and capabilities of the production processor, whereas the coprocessor in
CoPilot only has the permissions and capabilities of a peripheral within the system.
The CuPIDS architecture operates under the assumption that the operating
system is not compromised. As only a single OS executes over multiple processors,
this must be the case in order to ensure trustable operation of CuPIDS, as the OS
itself houses the monitoring functionality. The backbone of the CuPIDS architecture
are CuPIDS Production Process (CPP) and CuPIDS Shadow Process (CSP) pairs. A
CPP is the process executing on the production processor core and its corresponding
CSP is the process running on the shadow processor core that monitors that particular
CPP. When a production process is to be monitored, a CPP and CSP are created and
checked to ensure that they can be trusted. If both can be trusted, the CSP, followed
by the CPP, are loaded into memory and “hooks” from the CSP into the production
process’ virtual memory space are created. The CPP then executes on the production
processor while being monitored by the CSP executing on the shadow processor.
In order to keep efficiency as high as possible, the CSP performs checks on its
corresponding CPP only when certain events that can be used to detect an intrusion
occur. Such anomaly-based events include variable use/creation/deletion events and
checkpoint events - both of which are inserted into the CPP before execution. Events
are communicated from the CPP to the CSP via streamlined system calls that are
sent through the operating system’s kernel memory space.
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In the instance where an event is triggered and an intrusion detected, the CSP
can either simply notify that the CPP has been compromised, or it can notify as well
as block further execution of the process - a function that the CoPilot System cannot
perform [46]. Furthermore, events can be placed before/after key data structure
modifications, in honeypot code (i.e., invariants), or randomly. Since these events can
be placed anywhere and occur at any time, such an approach makes it very difficult,
if not impossible, for a timing-based attack to compromise a CPP.
Furthermore, CuPIDS not only uses anomaly-based intrusion detection as men-
tioned above, but also specification-based intrusion detection as well. This is done
through the use of white lists. When a CPP is created, a white list containing func-
tion, library, and system call source-destination pairs is created. Thus, when a jump
or branch in the code is taken, the branch destination address is compared to the
values in the white list to ensure that the branch is valid. This can also be used to
perform stack monitoring in order to detect buffer overflow attacks.
Not only is the CuPIDS architecture robust in terms of capabilities, it can also
detect intrusions in a matter of thousands of instructions rather than millions of
instructions that uniprocessor host-based (i.e., software-based monitoring) methods
typically take. Due to such a fast response time, the CuPIDS architecture affords
the ability for self-healing. This is done by leveraging the knowledge that there are
a number of known dangerous libraries that exist. When a function from such a
library is called, the page that corresponds to the data to be operated on can be
automatically copied. If the data is subsequently damaged by that function being
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called maliciously, CuPIDS may be able to automatically repair the damage using
the saved page, as if the malicious code had never executed. Furthermore, the fast
response time of CuPIDS also allows the forensic logging of intrusion events for later
analysis.
Despite CuPIDS’ robust nature, it is not without its drawbacks. The most no-
table of these drawbacks is that despite efforts to minimize overhead in CuPIDS, there
is still roughly a 15% performance decrease compared to non-monitored execution.
Also, since the OS is executing in an SMP fashion on both the production CPU and
the shadow CPU, the shadow CPU is not invisible to the production CPU. Thus,
if the OS is ever compromised, the entire intrusion detection system is susceptible
to being compromised. As a result, CuPIDS falls within the self-secure monitoring
system security category. Moreover, it may not even be verifiable whether or not the
intrusion detection system has been corrupted if the OS is ever compromised.
2.6.3.2 A Security Enhanced Chip Multiprocessor. Shi et al. propose
an IDS that is very similar to the CuPIDS architecture in [50]. Like the CuPIDS
architecture, the Security Enhanced Chip Multiprocessor (SECM) uses multiple pro-
cessing cores in an asymmetric manner where one core is used to monitor the host
core in parallel. Unlike CuPIDS, however, the SECM uses two distinct operating sys-
tems - one executing on each processing core. Furthermore, the SECM uses a shared
Level 2 (L2) cache, with each processor core containing its own Level 1 (L1) data and
instruction caches. State information is gathered by tapping directly into the memory
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bus between the caches and the processor core itself as well as instruction trace data.
Thus, each time a monitoring processor requests data, the request is checked by the
SECM thus enabling the monitoring of memory via cache, not main memory itself.
The operating systems of the SECM are implemented in a unique way for a
multi-core processor. The OS on the host processor is just a normal Linux-based ker-
nel. The OS on the monitoring processor is a stripped down Linux-based kernel. This
is done to give the monitoring OS a smaller “footprint”, thus making it more secure.
Furthermore, Shi et al. have implemented a scheme that partitions the privileges of
the two operating systems. The host OS is given privileges to only a certain amount
of non-threatening high level functions, while the secure OS is given full privileges
over the system. This ensures that the monitored processor core cannot circumvent
the secure processor core in the event that the monitored core is compromised. As a
result, the SECM falls within the tight-hard monitoring system security level.
As with CuPIDS, the SECM architecture uses many forms of detection to
determine if an intrusion has occurred. It implements both anomaly-based and
specification-based intrusion detection via checkpoints and call/return address check-
ing. State information is gathered via the memory bus between the L2/L1 caches and
the processor core itself. The execution trace is also used. Monitoring is performed by
the privileged processor checking each request made to memory by a lower privileged
processor. Such state information is gathered from the local memory bus connecting
the caches to the processor core rather than the actual memory bus external to the
processor, enabling the detection of relocation attacks that occur in cache. Further-
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more, kernel-level rootkits can be detected via openly available tools. In the event
that a rootkit is successfully installed, the SECM can recover, as a clean copy of the
monitored OS kernel space is stored by the privileged processor.
Performance of the SECM is somewhat unclear, however. Unlike the CuPIDS
architecture, the SECM is not actually implemented in hardware to date. Shi et
al. rely on performance emulation by a simulator to determine a general estimate of
performance. Furthermore, there is no comparison to the performance of a similarly
configured, non-monitored system. Thus, the benefits afforded by monitoring using
the SECM are potentially marred by performance degradation.
2.7 Hardware-assisted Security Mechanisms
While the research we have described up to this point has focused on actual
intrusion detection systems, many hardware-based mechanisms have been proposed
the focus specifically on a particular security threat or a small subset of threats.
Hardware-assisted security mechanisms are usually intended for specific applications.
As such they have thus far been targeted more at embedded and application specific
markets that tend to have tighter design constraints and more static software envi-
ronments. Implementation of such hardware-based mechanisms also tend to apply to
computer architecture in general, thus the concepts are not limited to a particular
system structure. This section describes such security mechanisms that are either
related to our work or have served as a foundation for the direction that we have
taken.
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2.7.1 Hardware-based Stack Protection. One of the most common attacks
used to compromise a system is known as stack smashing [45]. This attack uses some
weakness, usually a buffer overflow exploit, present within the code to rewrite infor-
mation residing on the stack. Information is rewritten in such a way as to rewrite the
return address of a function that has yet to complete. When the function completes
and attempts to return to the location from which it was originally called, it uses
the address that was rewritten by the buffer overflow, causing the control flow of the
executing process to be redirected from its own code to malicious code injected onto
the stack or residing somewhere else in memory.
In order to defend against the type of attack described above, a secure return
address stack (SRAS) has been proposed and simulated by Lee et al. in [34]. The
SRAS is a hardware-based last-in, first-out (LIFO) buffer similar to a stack, however
it only stores return addresses of functions whose blocks have been pushed onto the
stack rather than an entire function block. When a function returns, the address
stored at the top of the SRAS is then compared to the return address stored in the
main stack. If the two addresses differ, then the processor is notified so that it can
take appropriate action. This is realized via adding special instructions that control
the operation of the SRAS. As such, monitored code must explicitly communicate
with the monitoring mechanism to function. This, combined with its hardware-based
implementation, places this security mechanism in the loose-hard monitor security
level.
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Although the hardware-based nature of the SRAS makes it more secure, it is not
without its drawbacks. One such drawback is that it can only store a finite number of
return addresses. Thus, if the stack becomes completely filled, then the contents must
be moved to main memory to make room for new return addresses to be placed on the
SRAS. Memory locations containing overflow return addresses are protected by only
allowing the kernel to access them (assuming the kernel has not been compromised
through some other means). Furthermore, it should also be mentioned that although
the SRAS is dependent on the LIFO nature of the stack, it can handle non-LIFO
control flow in a number of ways. These include: not-allowing non-LIFO code to be
executed, creating new commands within the compiler to push return addresses onto
the SRAS at times other than function calls, and deactivating the SRAS completely.
2.7.2 Microinstruction-based Monitoring. Microprocessors each have an in-
struction set architecture (ISA) that is dictated by the architecture of the processor.
The ISA defines the machine-level instructions that allow the user/programmer to
control the hardware. Most microprocessors today also implement microinstructions
that coordinate data and control flow within the processor. Thus, a single machine
instruction can be composed of many microinstructions. Such microinstructions are
not accessible by the programmer and enable the modification of a processor’s archi-
tecture while keeping the same ISA for compatibility reasons.
Rather than add external hardware to monitor the execution of a processor,
Ragel et al. have proposed a method of creating self-checking instructions by modi-
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fying the microinstructions that implement potentially “dangerous” instructions [48].
Ragel’s system is intended to be applied to embedded applications only, as their pro-
posed methods also require a modified compiling chain in order to determine which
instructions in code are deemed as “critical”. Buffer overflow attacks, fault injection
attacks, and out of bounds memory address accesses are checked for. Their proposed
microinstruction changes that implement these checking schemes are just used as ex-
amples of what can be done with their system and do not represent the full capabilities
of such a system.
Their system prevents certain buffer overflow attacks by using a hardware-based
return address stack like that described in 2.7.1. Faults injected into the instruction
path are checked by reading the instruction memory before an instruction is fetched
and comparing that instruction with the one that is fetched by the instruction fetch
unit. Faults injected into the data path (i.e., the execution pipeline) are checked
by storing the write-back address (determined in the instruction decode stage) to a
FIFO buffer and comparing that to the actual location where the data is written back
to during the write-back stage of the pipeline. Memory boundary checks are also
performed by making sure that instructions do not access areas of memory outside of
a particular range. This method is rather coarse-grained, however, and finer-grained
methods are described in 2.7.3.
Clock speed reduction as a result of implementing micro-embedded monitoring
is reported to be less than 7% for all applications tested. Area overhead associated
with the added microcode is also relatively minimal at no more than 15% added area.
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It should be noted, however, that no mention is made of how effective these techniques
are at actually detecting the attacks that they are designed to defend against.
2.7.3 Control Flow Monitoring. While tracking the execution flow of code
is not a new concept in the ID field, doing so at the hardware level is a relatively
recent development. As code is ultimately executed by the processor as machine level
instructions, it is logical to assume that we can gain insight into the execution of the
code if we could directly monitor the pipeline of a processor. Some research has been
conducted to view this state information and utilize it for intrusion detection tasks.
In [72], Zhang et al. propose modifying the XOM secure processor model to be
able to check the control flow of a program for anomalous events using hardware-
based methods. Whereas software-based control flow monitoring techniques typically
can only track control flow at a function/syscall granularity, Zhang’s method can
track a program at the instruction level. For the detection system to know what
what is considered “normal”, two methods are used. The first consists of parsing the
text segment of the process to be monitored. This determines where all branching
instructions reside in the process’ virtual memory space as well as the address that
each branch can branch to. The second method involves executing the process in
a known trusted state in order to train the detection system to be able to recognize
what branching behavior is considered “normal”. With this information, the detection
system monitors the current program counter, the next program counter, and the type
of instruction as the processor executes. The detection hardware is implemented as
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a staged checking path where the more common branches are checked earlier in a
previous stage in order to keep pipeline stalls to a minimum. If a branch jumps
to an address not deemed as legitimate or a branch instruction occurs where there
should not be one, then an exception is raised and handled securely by the monitoring
hardware. A similar action is taken if a degree of abnormal branching behavior occurs.
A hardware based return address stack like that described in 2.7.1 is also implemented
to ensure that function and system calls return to the appropriate address when
complete.
Further work done by Zhang et al. and presented in [73] has improved on the
anomaly detection capabilities of their previous work. Their previous work could
only look at a single branch when checking for anomalous behavior. However, their
updated technique can now correlate multiple branch instructions when checking for
anomalous control flow behavior. This is done by recording all “normal” execution
paths during training. Such paths are stored in a table that can be accessed by the
control flow checking hardware during runtime. This anomalous path detection is
not limited to a particular number of branches (control flow changes). Furthermore,
this more recent work has also improved direct jump checking by parsing dynamic
libraries linked at runtime in addition to the already parsed process binary (text
segment). Results of this work show that anomaly detection can be done with very
little overhead due to the control flow checking being done in hardware. Additionally,
anomaly detection efficiency was found to be high and occurred within a few cycles
of entering the production processor’s pipeline due to the staged design of the control
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flow checking hardware. Drawbacks still exist, however. These include the detection
efficiency’s dependence on how well trained the system is and the fact that system
must be trained for each process that may be monitored - a possibly arduous process
for a dynamic, multiprogrammed environment. As such, these methods are probably
better suited to embedded applications where the software environment is more tightly
controlled.
Arora et al. present even more recent research efforts in [3] whereby they in-
troduce a mechanism that provides for multi-grained, real-time monitoring at the
instruction execution level. To enable this, the program counter and instruction
register are used to expose the current executing instruction and its corresponding
address in memory to the monitoring hardware. Detection is accomplished by utiliz-
ing specification-based ID techniques. However, it should be noted that no security
policy is explicitly defined by the developer/user. The specification is created by
utilizing static program analysis techniques to define permissible behavior which is
then checked against during program execution. Additional static analysis is also
performed at program loading to gather address information for dynamically loaded
libraries which is unknown at compile time. The program attributes that are extracted
to define the specification are described below:
• Inter-procedural Control Flow: This attribute is concerned with proper control
flow between different functions within the code being monitored. This infor-
mation is extracted from the code by creating a function call graph that maps
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all function calls and their return addresses within a program. The function call
graph is then converted into a finite state machine (FSM) that is implemented
in hardware. Checking done using this information is the most coarse-grained
of all of the invariant checks.
• Intra-procedural Control Flow: This attribute is concerned with proper control
flow within a function residing in the code being monitored. This information
is gathered by determining all possible branch source-destination pairs within
all functions within the code to be monitored.
• Instruction Stream Integrity: As not all attacks change the control flow of the
targeted program, this attribute is used to ensure that the code within a basic
block has not been modified. These invariants are determined by creating a
hash value for every basic block within the code. Checking done using this
information is the most fine-grained of all of the invariant checks.
The mechanism is implemented in three main blocks - one corresponding to
each of the three types of invariant checking performed. Intra-procedural control flow
checking is performed similarly to hardware-based return address stacks described in
2.7.1. The FSM mentioned earlier compares the state index (generated at compile
time) of the start and return addresses. If the start and return state indexes correlate
to an allowable control flow change represented in the FSM, the control flow change is
allowed to continue. Inter-procedural control flow checks are performed by using the
starting address of the currently executing function to calculate offsets of the branches
within the function as they execute. These are then compared to the stored branch
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source-destination pairs (generated at compile time). Instruction stream integrity is
accomplished by buffering the instructions of a basic block as the processor executes
them. When a branch instruction is reached, a hash of the instruction buffer is
computed and compared to the corresponding hash that was statically generated at
compile time.
Each invariant check includes a mechanism for stalling the processor should any
part of the detection process occur too slowly. As such, this detection runs in lock
step with the executing code being monitored. The detector’s state is managed by
control logic in each of the three main blocks. As such, this detection mechanism does
not execute any software of its own. Due to the parallel, hardware-based nature of
this mechanism, little overhead is introduced. The only degradation in performance is
caused by the hashing of basic blocks for instruction stream integrity checking. In this
case 50%-60% of basic blocks are reported to be able to be hashed without having any
noticeable performance penalty. It should also be noted that since this mechanism is
synthesized based on static analysis techniques, this mechanism is application/process
specific.
2.7.4 Non-executable Memory. Certain forms of malicious attacks execute
code from a process’ data memory space - a space typically used for storing only data.
Such attacks are enabled by the fact that processors based on a von Nuemann archi-
tecture have a shared data and instruction memory space. As a result, the processor
can not distinguish a data access from an instruction access. Recently, however, mod-
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ern von Nuemann-based processors have been updated to be able to distinguish the
difference, disallowing instructions from executing if they resided within a portion of
memory deemed as non-executable. AMD first commercially introduced this technol-
ogy, known as No-Execute (NX) bit, and later Intel with the eXecute Disable (XD)
bit [56].
The NX/XD bit works by adding an extra bit to all addresses within the page
table entry (PTE) [19]. If the program counter is set to (i.e., branches to) an entry
in the page table that has the NX/XD bit enabled, the instruction is not allowed to
execute and an exception occurs. Thus certain attacks, like buffer overflows, can be
prevented quickly and efficiently in hardware.
2.8 Trusted Operating Systems
While our work does not focus on implementing a trusted operating system, it
does require that the software or operating system to be protected can execute in a
trusted state for certain tasks. Most operating systems start up via an unrestricted
process. That is, that there are no checks to ensure that what is being booted has
not been compromised in some way. Lipton et al. propose a method call Spy that can
create a trusted environment from untrustable machines [36]. Through their research,
they formally define the problem of trusted software and prove that in order to be able
to trust software, some form of hardware - the spy - must be present to enforce certain
key policies. Similar work is presented in [23]. This research specifically explains how
an actual coprocessor can be used to perform invariant checking of key kernel data
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structures, ensure filesystem integrity, as well as detect viruses - all of which work
together to create a secure operating environment. Earlier work by Arbaugh et al.
resulted in the Aegis system which implements system wide modifications to ensure
than an OS can be booted into a known trusted state [2]. Modifications to the system
include creating BIOS enhancements that allow for a multi-level booting approach
where each level in the boot process provides for more privileges once the previous
level has been successfully completed.
Perhaps most relevant to our work, however, is a method used by CuPIDS by
which the OS operates in an untrusted state, but certain key operations require that a
temporary trusted state be created in order to complete. A key example of this is the
creation a shadow process to hook into and begin monitoring a production process.
Once the shadow process is created and is executing on the shadow CPU, the OS
is no longer in a trusted state. Further information on how the secure startup of a
trusted process completes can be found in [59].
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III. Research Concepts and Methodology
I
n this chapter we discuss the concepts that serve as a basis for our research. We
begin by presenting our research hypothesis as well as discuss the security exploits
that our work is intended to target. This is followed by the general architecture
- hardware and software - that enables robust parallel security monitoring at the
hardware level. We then go on to present the general functional primitive concepts
that leverages our architecture to gather and process state information.
3.1 Research Hypothesis
If there is one main drawback (with respect to security) in the development of
modern computing architectures, it is that they have primarily been designed with
performance, rather than security, in mind. Our research explores ways in which we
can break through the limitations that current architectures impose. We intend to
define new means by which system state can be revealed and processed to allow for
more robust and flexible security policy compliance monitoring mechanisms. To ac-
complish this, we believe a contemporary multiprocessor computer architecture can
be modified in such a way as to allow the creation of functional primitives that can
expose and process state information in ways previously unavailable at the hardware
level. This will not only allow for more secure, better performing, and more capa-
ble security policy compliance monitoring, but also provide a flexible architecture
by which security functions can be tailored to particular applications on the same
platform.
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3.2 Targeted Exploits
Our theories apply to a very broad range of events. As we are viewing events
at the hardware level, both malicious activity as and erroneous program behavior
can be detected. As such, our concepts can be viewed as applying to SPCM. SPCM
includes detecting malicious activity as well as detecting unexpected activity, such as
bugs or errors that software developers and quality assurance (QA) testing did not
catch. Therefore, our research is not trying to defend against any one specific subset
of events. Additionally, it should be noted that the memory introspection techniques
we propose focus on main memory; however, it is safe to assume that the monitoring
concepts we propose can can also provide us the ability to monitor a processor’s cache.
Thus, the monitoring concepts resulting from this research could be applied in such
a way as to protect against attacks that leverage the cache (i.e., relocation attacks).
3.3 Architectural Overview
This section provides an overview of the hardware and software architecture
of the platform for which the functional primitives are being developed for. It also
describes the abilities and features that this architecture architecture enables.
3.3.1 Hardware Architecture. The general architecture of our parallel mon-
itoring concept is shown in Figure 3.1. As can be seen, the architecture contains
multiple processing elements - the production processor unit (PPU) and the shadow
monitoring unit (SMU). The PPU is responsible for executing all user-related code
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such as the system’s main OS (if one is present) and any applications. The SMU is
responsible for performing all security monitoring tasks. The number of processors
the architecture supports is unlimited, however, each PPU in the system should have
a dedicated SMU that corresponds to it.
Figure 3.1: General Overview of the Hardware Architecture
A shared memory architecture in a UMA configuration is used as the foundation
for developing our parallel security monitoring techniques. This allows both the PPU
and the SMU to have the potential to access all memory and peripherals within the
system. Additionally, the system is configured in such a way as to restrict access
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to certain peripherals for each of the processing elements. An example would be to
assign the serial port of the system to only be accessed by the SMU for administrator
control purposes. This peripheral assignment is dependent on the application and
controlled by the system designer.
Although shared memory multiprocessing platforms have been available for
years, shared memory multicore processors (multiple processing cores residing within
the same physical package) have become commercially available only recently. Multi-
core chips have the potential for their cores to be more tightly coupled than the cores
of their multi-processor counterparts. This is because the cores of a multicore chip
can be designed to communicate with each other via on chip facilities such as on-die
interconnects or a shared cache, rather than having to rely on an external (to the
entire processor) system bus. Our research leverages such a multicore architecture
to enable new forms of parallel security monitoring. As a result, we can tap into
certain signals within the PPU, enabling the PPU to transmit state information to
the SMU purely in hardware as depicted in Figure 3.1. This eliminates the need to
use the system bus for communicating the state of the PPU to the SMU, allowing
our monitoring techniques to not be limited only to state information accessible from
the memory bus and/or the core’s debug logic. Similarly, this tighter coupling of the
cores allows control signals from the SMU to the PPU to be implemented without the
need of an external system bus as well.
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3.3.2 Shadow Monitoring Unit Configuration. The SMU in the architecture
can be implemented in a number of ways providing a level of flexibility for efficient and
capable hardware-based, parallel security monitoring. Different types of monitoring
requires different types of hardware. For example, some mechanisms may need to
detect illegitimate events immediately, thus requiring the monitoring mechanisms to
be implemented using real-time-logic (RTL). Additionally, a mechanism may need to
perform a complex algorithm on state information over a period of time, in which case
a coprocessor would be more appropriate for implementing the monitoring mechanism.
As such, the SMU can be implemented as a coprocessor, RTL, or a combination of
the two. Furthermore, if implementing the SMU using a coprocessor, it can either
be identical to the PPU or a totally different architecture altogether. As such, the
SMU can be seen as a black box in an overall architecture that we propose to be well
suited for creating and implementing real-time, parallel monitoring mechanisms. The
configuration of the SMU is left to the system designer and is dependent on the needs
of the particular application(s).
How the SMU is implemented affects the capabilities of the monitoring hard-
ware, however. If a coprocessor is used, the SMU can have native access to main
memory and can execute actual code. If RTL is used to implement the security mech-
anism(s), however, the SMU will lose the ability to execute code. Additionally, using
RTL to implement the SMU will make accessing main memory less trivial (but not
impossible) than if implementing the SMU as a coprocessor. However, it is not re-
quired that the SMU have access to main memory depending on the application of
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the SMU. As such, the SMU may not always take advantage of the shared memory
nature of our proposed platform. To denote the optional nature of the SMU’s connec-
tion to main memory, the connections from main memory to the SMU are denoted
by dashed lines in Figure 3.1. It should also be noted however, that no matter the
implementation of the SMU, the SMU will always have direct connections to the PPU
for gathering state information and sending control signals.
3.3.3 Software Architecture. Shared memory architectures are typically
implemented to facilitate an SMP environment. In an SMP system, every processor
is exactly the same and executes similar types of tasks. For this to occur, an OS must
be able to support SMP so that the OS can assign tasks that can take advantage
of multiple processors. SMP systems also rely heavily on dependent tasks using the
shared memory nature inherent in an SMP system to share data among the multiple
processes on different processors.
Although the hardware architecture is built upon a shared memory architecture,
the processors are used in an asymmetric manner; that is, one processor is responsible
for performing entirely different tasks than the other processor in the system. Rather
than use a single OS spanning both processing elements, two entirely separate OSs
are used - one executing on each processor. Whereas the CuPIDS architecture relied
on the OS for gathering state information and communicating between the processing
elements, we are able to use two separate OSs since we gather state information and
perform inter-processor communication via hardware. This also enables our system
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to be implemented on computer architectures that do not support cache coherency,
as cache coherency is a requirement for SMP systems. The software architecture is
shown in Figure 3.2 below.
Figure 3.2: General Software Architecture
Despite both OSs being standalone and using hardware as a communication
medium, the PPU OS may still need to be modified in order to explicitly send certain
synchronization signals to the SMU. This explicit communication is depicted by the
dashed arrow in Figure 3.1. This is dependent on the the type of monitoring being
performed. However, as we desire the operation of the SMU to be as transparent to
the SMU as possible for security reasons, explicit communication from the PPU to
the SMU is kept to a minimum. An example of a modification required to implement
such a communication mechanism is to modify the scheduler to trigger an interrupt
signal on the SMU to notify the SMU that a context switch has occurred. Thus, there
may be minimal coupling between the PPU code and the SMU code.
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It should be noted that an OS need not be implemented on either the PPU or
SMU. The implementation of software is completely up to the system designer and is
dependent on the type of security monitoring to be performed as well as the target
computing environment (i.e., an embedded system may not use an OS, but a general
purpose system will always use an OS). This creates a large degree of flexibility in
how the security-related monitoring is implemented and to what systems our parallel
monitoring techniques can be applied.
3.3.4 Monitoring System Security. One of the ultimate goals of our research
is to create a real-time detection system with access to state information, while ex-
posing as little of the monitoring mechanism to the PPU as possible. We assume the
PPU is vulnerable to attack, so the less visible the SMU is to the PPU, the more se-
cure the SMU will be from attack. The software executing on the PPU is the primary
medium of attack we are protecting the monitoring system (i.e., the SMU) against.
Therefore, the software coupling between the PPU and the SMU is minimized as
much as possible. As a result, hardware must be used to tightly couple the PPU to
the SMU. This improves security over more software dependent coprocessor intrusion
detection systems such as CuPIDS [59]. Additionally, the user only has visibility of
the PPU in the system and as such has no way of explicitly communicating with the
SMU. Thus, only a system administrator can directly communicate to the SMU and
such communication does not go through the PPU in any way.
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As the software executing on the PPU may have to be modified in order to
explicitly coordinate with the SMU depending on the monitoring mechanism being
implemented, coupling between the production code and the monitoring code is in-
evitable. Although the modifications would be minimal (synchronization signals at
most), it still creates an avenue for an attacker to alter the operation of the SMU.
However, since modifications should be minimal, the attack surface is reduced, and
hence the portion of the PPU code that must be protected to ensure that the opera-
tion of the SMU cannot be illegitimately altered is decreased. Considering the amount
of useful state information we are gathering, this is an improvement in the security of
the monitoring mechanism itself compared to other host-based and coprocessor-based
intrusion detection systems. It should also be mentioned that the need for the PPU to
explicitly communicate to the SMU mostly affects a multiprogrammed environment
where multiple different processes may need to be monitored.
In certain cases the PPU may need to send certain data regarding a specific
monitored process to the SMU when such a process is created. An example of this is
the page directory address of a process to be monitored. When this communication
between the processing elements occurs, the PPU should be in a known safe state
and only required portions of the kernel should have access to the communication
mechanisms. This is similar to how a shadow process was created in CuPIDS [59].
Further information on creating a trusted OS state in an insecure system is described
in [23]. As our research focuses on the security monitoring mechanisms themselves,
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not on creating a single contiguous security monitoring system, this is outside the
scope of our research.
3.4 Target Environment
Although coprocessor-based intrusion detection systems are more flexible than
purely hardware-based security mechanisms and can be implemented in multipro-
grammed (e.g., desktop and server) environments, they have their limits. In the case
of a system like CuPIDS, the reliance on software makes the IDS itself vulnerable to
attack and introduces communication overheads. In the case of a system like CoPi-
lot which relies more on hardware to perform security monitoring, visibility into the
system’s memory space is limited, and as a result, so is its flexibility. Our research
focuses on further bridging the gap between software and hardware mechanisms in
order to make security mechanisms that are high performing, yet flexible and secure.
As such, we are not targeting one specific computing environment, but rather the
entire spectrum of computing environments. The techniques we propose are just a
sample of what can be done with the novel multicore shared-memory architecture we
propose.
3.5 Functional Primitives
In this section we present models by state information is gathered from the PPU
and leverage that information for security-related monitoring. A number of methods
are presented here. Most methods are mutually exclusive of the others presented,
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thus a single concept or a combination of all the concepts can be implemented into a
design depending on a user’s specific security needs and the target environment.
3.5.1 Multi-context Hardware Monitors. A number of hardware-based se-
curity mechanisms discussed in Section 2.7 are limited by being application specific.
As such, only one instruction stream context can be monitored by these security
mechanisms. This limits the effectiveness of these monitors in multi-programmed en-
vironments. While such hardware-assisted security mechanisms may be feasible for
application specific and focused embedded applications, embedded applications are
becoming more robust and complex. Additionally, these security mechanisms would
also benefit common multi-programmed (multi-context) environments. It is impor-
tant to mention that not every context needs to be monitored, but currently there is
no way for the security mechanisms to even discern between separate processes. Thus,
without running behavioral analysis on the system to create an idea of what behavior
is acceptable, these mechanisms will not work correctly when trying to operate in
a multi-programmed environment. Even with having done behavioral analysis, such
monitors are only feasible for less complex or tightly controlled systems and/or are
prone to producing false positives. Additionally, such mechanisms will have difficulty
even if only trying to monitor a single process as the monitor cannot precisely and
efficiently discern between different processes.
As we desire the SMU to be able to discern between different processes executing
on the PPU in real-time, exposing the process identifier (PID) is the most logical piece
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of state information that can enable this. In an OS, the system scheduler determines
when each process executes. It keeps track of all processes and the state of the process
using a table stored in the kernel space of the OS itself. This portion of the kernel
is paged, but hardwired into main memory, thus the location where the currently
executing PID is stored remains constant. Monitoring this location in memory can
allow us to keep track of what process is currently executing.
It should be noted that we are not concerned with how the monitoring hardware
knows which process or processes it needs to monitor, however, we are concerned about
whether the capability exists to use the PID to allow the SMU to be able to discern
between various executing processes. Once the PID has been made visible outside of
the PPU, the SMU can take the appropriate action to enable multi-context hardware
monitoring. There are three general ways this can be done and each is described
ahead.
Figure 3.3: Multicontext Monitoring With Multiple Monitors
65
1. Monitoring a single process out of many currently executing processes: This is
the simplest case. It requires the monitoring hardware to be enabled only when
the PPU outputs the PID corresponding to the process to be monitored.
2. Monitoring multiple processes with the same hardware: This is similar to the
first method, but the SMU has a list of PIDs that correspond to monitored
processes. This case also requires some method of storing state when switching
between processes being monitored. As such, it is practical to implement the
SMU in the form of code executing on a processor core for the ease of writing
to memory. Doing so also provides for flexibility by using the same monitor-
ing hardware, but with different monitoring algorithms for different monitored
processes.
3. Monitoring multiple processes with multiple types of monitoring: This is the
most complex case. This method must monitor multiple processes, but uses
multiple independent hardware monitors. Some form of selection logic is needed
to generate the select signal that enables a particular monitoring mechanism, as
well as complete the connections between the PPU and the SMU so the active
monitor can retrieve state information from the PPU. This method is depicted
in Figure 3.3.
3.5.2 Program Counter and Instruction Trace Exposure. The program
counter (PC) keeps track of the memory location containing the currently executing
instruction. We intend to monitor the PC as the PPU executes and use it to aid in
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SPCM tasks. This information can be leveraged to provide the two main capabilities
described below.
3.5.2.1 Execution Policy Enforcement. By keeping track of the PC,
we can keep track of exactly from where in memory an instruction is being executed.
Thus, when having defined where in memory code is allowed to execute and where
it is disallowed, the PC can be used to check if such a policy is being adhered to or
not. This knowledge of what code is allowable can have multiple granularities ranging
from the global level to the basic block level.
Figure 3.4: Program Counter Monitor High-level Architecture
Knowing the PC at any given time enables an ability similar to that of XD bit
and NX bit technology from Intel and AMD, respectively. This technology prevents
the execution of instructions residing in memory locations deemed as non-executable
by adding an extra bit in the page table entries stored in memory [56]. Gaining
access to the PC can provide a similar protection for processors that do not natively
support it. This concept is depicted in Figure 3.4. For every instruction, its PC is
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automatically checked by the SMU. Theoretically, we have the ability to keep track
of every address in the memory space and then compare the PC in order to check
if the executing instructions are allowed. Additionally, it should be mentioned that
such a mechanism can also be used to aid in the enforcement of certain permissions
in an asymmetrically shared memory space like the one proposed in Section 3.5.4.1.
3.5.2.2 Branch Source-Destination Address Checking. A number of
researchers have proposed methods that monitor control flow changes as code exe-
cutes for security purposes [16, 29, 34]. Furthermore, a number of hardware-based
mechanisms have already been implemented to leverage such information for branch
source-destination address checking [3,73]. While not proposing any new methods to
perform branch source-destination checking, its important to mention that the cur-
rent platform can be used to implement such a system, as these techniques are an
application of exposing the program counter and instruction state information. As
such, our architecture can facilitate similar monitors.
3.5.3 Peripheral Access Control. Just as processes should only execute in-
structions from legitimate memory locations, processes should also only access the
peripherals within the system that they were originally intended. As a result, a hard-
ware mechanism that could enforce such policies would be beneficial. Moreover, im-
plementing such a mechanism in hardware would make circumventing such a policies
more difficult than if protections were implemented in software.
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Figure 3.5: Peripheral Access Control Monitor General Architecture
The general architecture of the peripheral access control monitor is shown in
Figure 3.5. As this primitive specifically monitors peripheral access on a per process
basis, this requires techniques proposed in Section 3.5.1 to reveal the PID of the
currently executing process to the SMU. Additionally, to determine what peripheral,
if any, is being accessed by a process at any one time, the monitor also requires
visibility into the addresses that the process is accessing. This assumes that the PPU
uses memory mapped I/O, as communicating with peripherals occurs as read and
write operations to specific address ranges via the main memory bus being monitored.
3.5.4 Hardware-based Memory Introspection. Various memory introspec-
tion techniques have been used for hardware-based security monitoring in systems
such as CoPilot and CuPIDS [46, 59]. We present a number of techniques related
to the hardware-based memory introspection below which are complementary to the
primitives we have proposed thus far.
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3.5.4.1 Asymmetrically Shared Main Memory. As our platform is con-
structed on a shared-memory architecture, both the PPU and the SMU can access the
same main memory. This is ideal from a monitoring standpoint as both the PPU and
the SMU can have visibility into the same physical memory space. Traditionally, how-
ever, all processors in a shared-memory architecture have access to the entire memory
space and can read and overwrite the data corresponding to a process executing on
another processor. Although safeguards are usually put in place (within the OS) to
ensure that a process cannot alter another process, this cannot be assumed as true
if the system is ever compromised. To limit this vulnerability, we wish to minimize
the amount of knowledge the PPU has of the SMU, making the SMU’s operation
as transparent to the PPU as possible. Thus, the traditional shared-memory model
must be altered to facilitate such a capability. This change is further reinforced by
the architecture executing independent and different software on the SMU than the
PPU, whereas a traditional shared-memory model is implemented with a single OS
spread across multiple processors.
Figure 3.6 depicts a high-level view of how the shared memory is organized (not
drawn to scale). In order to make the SMU’s memory space invisible to the PPU (so
the PPU can not be used to compromise the SMU), the PPU’s software/OS must
be instructed to view only a portion of the total available physical memory space.
This region of memory should be contiguous, otherwise the PPU would have to be
aware of the SMU’s memory space - something we are trying to avoid. The SMU
attains visibility into the PPU’s memory space by being configured to have access to
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Figure 3.6: Memory Map and Permissions as Viewed by the PPU and the SMU
the entire physical memory space. As such, the SMU has access to its own memory
space while still being able to access the PPU’s memory space for security related
monitoring. Essentially, a quasi non-uniform memory access (NUMA) architecture is
created from a UMA architecture. This architecture differs from a traditional NUMA,
however, in that the memory space is asymmetrically distributed, as the SMU has
access to both the PPU’s memory space as well as its own, while the PPU only has
access to its own memory space. Additionally, a processor must request access to
another processor’s memory space in a traditional NUMA architecture, while our
quasi NUMA architecture specifically avoids this requirement in order for the SMU
to be as invisible to the PPU as possible.
While this architecture can provide the SMU visibility into the PPU’s physical
memory space, this is not enough. Further modifications to the traditional shared-
memory model must be made in order to protect the integrity of the software executing
from the PPU’s memory space. This is because the SMU views the entire physical
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memory space as its own, which could lead to inadvertently overwriting portions of the
PPU’s memory space, causing such code to be corrupted if not careful. Additionally,
the SMU must be prevented from executing instructions that reside within the PPU’s
memory space, as executing such instruction would pose a security risk to the SMU. As
a result, the memory space must consist of regions with their own specific permissions.
These regions apply only to the SMU’s view of the memory space and are described
below:
• PPU Shared Memory: This region maps directly to the PPU’s physical memory
space. It provides the SMU with read/write access to the PPU’s memory for
monitoring and data restoration tasks. This region is non-executable, as we want
to prevent the possibility of the SMU inadvertently executing any malicious code
that may reside within the PPU’s memory space.
• Safe SMU-exclusive: This region acts as a safety measure. As we leave the
decision of what data is stored by the monitoring hardware to the developer,
we provide this region to store information that may be malicious in nature.
An example would be storing a possibly corrupted block of instructions from
the PPU’s memory. Storing this in a non-executable memory space prevents
the possibility of such code corrupting the OS/software executing on the SMU.
This region can be non-contiguous, but must map to physical addresses that
only the SMU has visibility into.
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• Open SMU-exclusive: This region is the only region of the monitor’s memory
space from which instructions can be executed. As such, it is used to store the
monitoring OS and/or any software that executes on the SMU. This region can
be non-contiguous, but must map to physical addresses that only the SMU has
visibility into.
Memory regions that require instructions to be non-executable can be enforced
through various hardware-based means. Processors based on a Harvard architecture
naturally contain a non-executable memory space (the data space) as the data and
instruction memories are separate. Processors supporting NX/XD bit technology
described in 2.7.4 can also be used. If the processor is neither Harvard-based nor
does it have native support for the no-execute bit, an execution policy enforcer like
the one described in 3.5.2.1 can be implemented to perform a similar non-executable
capability.
The asymmetrically shared main memory operates only on the physical memory
space, as opposed to the virtual memory space. The physical memory space is the
data stored in memory as seen purely from the hardware level. Virtual memory on
the other hand organizes data into a number of pages that require the OS and page
table directories (located in memory) to access. As this method relies on the SMU
being able to address the PPU’s memory at the physical level, on its own, it can only
enable security monitoring mechanisms that rely on physical memory introspection.
CoPilot, for example, relies on such a capability [46]. However, this method can also
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help to enable memory introspection into the virtual memory space as well when
combined with the concepts proposed in Sections 3.5.4.2 and 3.5.4.3.
3.5.4.2 Co-opted Memory Management Unit. The CuPIDS prototype
is able to use a separate processor to monitor the user space of code executing on
a production processor by creating a monitoring shadow process that hooks into a
production process’ virtual memory space [59]. This is made possible by the single OS
nature of CuPIDS which tightly couples the monitoring software to the production
software being monitored. As our goal is to create a system where the monitoring
software is as loosely coupled to the production software as possible, we have opted
to execute completely separate software on each processor - preventing the creation
of hooks into the virtual memory subsystem, as was done in the CuPIDS prototype.
Therefore, we propose modifying the memory management unit (MMU) of the PPU
in order to access state information associated with user-space processes executing
on the PPU. It should be noted that as this method targets the virtual memory
subsystem, this technique is intended for dynamic, multiprogrammed environments.
The MMU of a processor is responsible for controlling the translation of virtual
memory addresses into physical memory addresses. In traditional computer archi-
tectures supporting virtual memory, the MMU resides within the processor itself.
Therefore the MMU only services memory requests made by the processor core that
contains it (i.e., contemporary multi-core processors have an MMU for each core).
However, to monitor the state of user space processes in our system, we propose mod-
74
ifying the PPU’s MMU such that the SMU can take control of (co-opt) it. This enables
the SMU to be able to access the virtual memory space of the currently executing
process on the PPU. Additionally, it should be noted that we are not proposing mod-
ifications to the virtual memory system itself, but rather we are proposing to modify
the way in which the MMU can be controlled, while still maintaining compatibility
with the currently accepted virtual memory model. This allows us to continue to use
the abstract concept of virtual memory, rather than having to worry about modifying
the complex functionality of the virtual memory system itself.
Figure 3.7: Co-opted Memory Management Unit High-level Architecture
The general architecture of the co-opted MMU concept is shown in Figure 3.7.
It should be noted that we are not concerned with how the virtual address being
monitored is obtained. Therefore, it is assumed that the SMU has knowledge of where
key data structures to be monitored reside within a process’ virtual memory space.
As the virtual address is known by the SMU, state information about the currently
75
executing process such as the PID, effective address, PC, etc. can be monitored via
methods proposed in Section 3.5.1 and 3.5.2.1 to determine when the PPU accesses
the data structure in question. The MMU is then co-opted and the physical address
corresponding to the virtual address is retrieved and can be used by the SMU to
access that portion of the PPU’s virtual address space.
3.5.4.3 SMU with Multiple Memory Management Units. Another
option for gaining visibility into the PPU’s virtual memory space, is to use the MMU
of the SMU itself, assuming the SMU includes an MMU. Contemporary processors
contain an MMU and access a process’ virtual memory space by updating a register
used to store the value corresponding to the physical location of a process’ page
directory in memory. It is this register that determines to what virtual memory space
addresses correspond as the processor executes code. As such, the processor can access
the virtual memory space of any process within the system, so long as it is known
where the page directory for a given process resides in memory. As the architecture
can provide the SMU access to the PPU’s memory space via asymmetrically shared
main memory presented in Section 3.5.4.1, the MMU residing within the SMU has
access to the memory locations containing the page directory for PPU processes. This
enables the SMU to be able to access the PPU’s virtual memory space, so long as it
is provided the address where the particular page directory resides.
Using the SMU’s sole MMU may introduce complications since the SMU will
require access to its own code for execution, but is using its MMU to view the virtual
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memory space of a process on the PPU. This can potentially result in the SMU not
being able to return to executing its own code. To overcome such a complication,
we propose modifying the SMU to contain multiple MMUs - a primary MMU and a
secondary MMU. This is shown in Figure 3.8. The primary MMU is used only for
memory accesses for code executing on the SMU itself. All accesses made by the SMU
to the virtual memory space of a process executing on the PPU use the secondary
MMU.
Figure 3.8: Multi-MMU SMU High-level Architecture
Monitoring the virtual memory space does not have to be limited to the cur-
rently executing process as was the case with MMU co-opting. This is a result of
the SMU’s secondary MMU being completely independent of the PPU, allowing the
control register that points to the page directory to not point to the page directory
of the process currently executing on the PPU.
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In contemporary operating systems such as Windows and Linux, the scheduler
decides when a process executes on the hardware. Processes that are not currently
executing reside on the ready, I/O, or waiting queues [51]. At this point, the secondary
MMU can be used to monitor the virtual memory space of the process waiting on one
of these queues to perform a number of process integrity checks. We see performing
such checks and other monitoring related tasks at this point as being able to provide
five benefits:
1. Ensured Trusted Execution: Monitoring performed while the process is waiting
on the ready queue can ensure that the process has not been compromised before
it even executes on the PPU. When performed every time before a process is to
be given execution time on the PPU, this can ensure that the process is always
in a trustable state before it executes.
2. Complex Algorithmic Monitoring: While waiting on the ready queue, the state
of the process is not changing. As such, the monitoring hardware does not have
to keep pace with real-time execution. This allows the implementation of algo-
rithmic monitoring operations that may not be feasible for real-time monitoring
as the process executes.
3. Efficient Resource Usage: Not all processes within the system are necessar-
ily monitored. Thus, the currently executing process may be one such non-
monitored process, while a process on the ready queue can be a monitored one.
In this case, the monitoring operations can be performed on the “ready” mon-
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itored process at a time where the monitoring hardware would otherwise have
gone unused.
4. Bad I/O Detection: Processes often times are waiting to receive data from some
external source. As such a process is waiting, the state of the process can be
recorded. After the process’ I/O operation is complete and the process is waiting
on the ready queue, the process could then be checked to determine if the I/O
operation has damaged the process via a buffer overflow or some other form of
input that may break the code. If detected, the recorded state gathered while
the process resided on the I/O queue can be used to repair the damaged process.
5. Deadlock Detection: Synchronization mechanisms are implemented as a means
to prevent multiple processes from accessing shared resources. However, in
preventing simultaneous access to shared resources, the possibility of introducing
a deadlock condition arises. While a process is waiting for a process to release
a resource, it is placed on a waiting queue. Thus, using a second MMU in the
SMU to check the state of processes as they wait on the waiting queue could be
used to determine if a deadlock condition on the PPU currently exists.
It is also important to note that all of these capabilities apply to both kernel-level and
user-level processes. Additionally, multiple monitored processes may be on the ready
queue at any one time. For this reason, it may even be desired to include multiple
secondary MMUs to be able to quickly and efficiently monitor multiple virtual memory
spaces. This may be especially useful for item 5 presented above.
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IV. Research Platform and Implementation
T
his chapter details the implementation of the architectural concepts proposed
in Chapter III. To that end, we describe the hardware and software environ-
ments of the development platform upon which all implementations are constructed.
We then discuss the details of implementing the various primitives on that platform.
It should be noted that not all of the proposed primitives were able to be imple-
mented using the development platform. In such cases, we discuss what is needed to
implement these concepts, had the development platform allowed.
4.1 Purpose of Implementation
Implementation is done in order to demonstrate the functionality of the pro-
posed primitives. In so doing, we help to validate our research hypothesis. The
primitives are implemented in such a way as to adhere to the architecture proposed
in chapter III. Although a number of the primitives are designed to be able to work
simultaneously with other primitives, each primitive is implemented individually in
order to show functionality as a proof of concept for that specific primitive. This is
done for simplicity as well as to show the modularity of our architecture. For concepts
that are not physically implemented, we describe what is required for such mecha-
nisms to be implemented and argue the soundness of such concepts despite the lack
of an actual implementation.
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4.2 Development Platform
For prototyping purposes, the Xilinx ML310 development board, which is built
around the Xilinx XC2VP30 Virtex-II Pro FPGA, is used. The XC2VP30 FPGA
contains two embedded PowerPC 405fx cores and supports multiple instances of the
Xilinx Microblaze softcore processor. The board itself contains a wide range of modern
interconnects allowing the use of DDR SDRAM, a compact flash (CF) card reader,
10 BaseT ethernet, and USB 2.0 for JTAG debug information. More standard I/O
interfaces such as serial (RS-232 UART), PS/2, and VGA are also present. It should
be mentioned that we use a serial port exclusively for connecting to the computer
where our development software resides. This allows commands and outputs to be
sent via a hyperterminal communication interface. For further detailed information
on the ML310 development board and the Virtex-II Pro FPGA, please refer to [65]
and [67], respectively.
4.2.1 Embedded Processors. The Virtex-II Pro can implement processors
based on both the IBM PowerPC and Xilinx Microblaze architectures. Both processor
types vary in complexity/capability and are discussed below. The Leon3 softcore
processor is also briefly described. Although the Leon3 processor is not a processor
directly supported by the development platform, we felt it important to mention as
it includes a number of capabilities that may be useful for future research efforts.
4.2.1.1 PowerPC 405fx. The Virtex-II Pro contains two IBM Pow-
erPC 405fx (PPC405) hardcore processors integrated directly within the FPGA fabric.
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As with all processors based on the PowerPC ISA, the PPC405 is a reduced instruc-
tion set computer (RISC) based on the von Neumann computing model. Although it
is integrated within the FPGA fabric, the PPC405 within the Virtex-II Pro retains
all of the same capabilities of its standalone counterparts. By today’s embedded pro-
cessing standards, the PPC405 is fairly sophisticated as it includes 16KB instruction
and data caches, floating point logic, and an MMU to provide support for virtual
memory and can operate at clock frequencies up to 400MHz. As such, the PPC405
can support multiprogrammed OSs such as Linux.
As two PPC405 cores are integrated into the XC2VP30, these processors can
be used simultaneously and in tandem to complete tasks benefitting from multiple
processors. However, the PPC405 does not implement cache coherency (i.e., the cache
of each PPC405 core is completely independent of the other). According to a Xilinx
engineer, a cache coherency mechanism may be able to be implemented, however, it
would be very slow. For this reason, the PPC405 processors can not be used in an
SMP fashion. This limits the PPC405 cores to only being able to execute different
bodies of code simultaneously or to operate in lockstep when in a multiprocessor
configuration. Such a configuration uses the two PowerPC processors to execute the
same code simultaneously, where one PPC405 core updates memory and I/O and the
other PPC405 core performs instruction/data integrity checks [43].
While the integrated PPC405 cores retain the same capabilities as their stan-
dalone versions, Xilinx has made some modifications to how the PPC405 cores interact
with the FPGA fabric. Such modifications are in the form of wrappers that encompass
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the PPC405 cores and are used to interface the PPC405 cores with Xilinx’s propri-
etary debugging hardware. These wrappers limit what pins are available to a system
designer. As such, not all pins of the PPC405 are available for access by a system
designer. Furthermore, the FPGA connects to the PPC405 cores only at the “pins”
of the PPC405 cores, thus not allowing any further visibility into signals within the
PPC405 core at any time other than when in a debugging mode. This limits the
flexibility of the PPC405 cores. Additionally, in order to keep the number of pins to a
minimum, certain signals, such as execution trace data, is output on a small number
of pins and must be decoded. This makes the retrieval of such state information less
than trivial. Due to such difficulties, the PPC405 is not well suited for our particular
applications despite its impressive specifications. More detailed information on the
PPC405 cores within the Virtex-II Pro FPGA can be found in [61,66].
4.2.1.2 Xilinx Microblaze 5.0. The Xilinx Microblaze 5.0 is a softcore
processor based on a Harvard architecture (i.e., separate instruction and data buses).
As with the PPC405, the Microblaze is a RISC-based processor, however, it only con-
tains a 5 stage pipeline. The softcore nature of the Microblaze allows it to be tailored
to a specific application. As such, features such as cache, the inclusion of a floating
point unit, and interrupt support are just a few of the features that can be configured.
This makes for a very flexible platform for prototyping. Additionally, the Microblaze
can even be augmented with application specific accelerators that tap directly into
the execution stage of the pipeline via fast simplex link (FSL) connections. This can
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greatly increase the performance of the Microblaze for a particular application. FSL
connections can also be used to connect multiple Microblaze processors together in
order to quickly share data.
Although the Microblaze is a simpler, albeit more flexible, design compared to
the PPC405, it does provide a basic computational capability. This makes the Mi-
croblaze well suited to embedded systems and for basic prototyping. The Microblaze
however, does not include an MMU of its own, so support for virtual memory is
non-existent as a result. It should be mentioned, however, that as the Microblaze is a
softcore processor, the processor has the potential to be modified to include an MMU.
Extending this to having two or more MMUs could allow the Microblaze processor to
act as part of an SMU that can perform virtual memory introspection via methods
discussed in Section 3.5.4.3. Despite lacking native MMU support, a custom version
of the Linux kernel, uCLinux, has been developed to run properly on the Microblaze.
As the Microblaze is a configurable softcore processor, I/O is not limited by a
physical pin packaging as is the case with the PPC405. This allows for almost every
signal within the Microblaze to be tapped into. Moreover, as headers that tap into
certain signals are generated when the Microblaze processor is synthesized, there is
no need to limit the number of I/O pins on the Microblaze, unlike with the PPC405
hardcores. This makes accessing processor state information much easier than the
PPC405 hardcores. For these reasons, the Microblaze is flexible while still providing
computational capabilities that suit our needs. As a result, the Microblaze softcore is
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used for implementations requiring a processor. Please refer to [68] for more detailed
information regarding the Xilinx Microblaze processor.
4.2.1.3 Leon3. The Leon3 is a softcore processor based on the Sun
Microsystems SPARC V8 architecture. One notable feature of this processor is that it
contains an MMU. As a number of concepts proposed in Chapter III rely on modifying
the MMU functionality of a processor, the Leon3 softcore processor may allow for
such modifications. The Leon3, however, is not compatible with Xilinx development
tools and adheres to the AMBA bus standard, rather than the CoreConnect Bus
Architecture used by the Microblaze and PPC405 processors. As a result, a completely
different development environment would have to be used.
4.2.2 CoreConnect Bus Architecture. Xilinx FPGAs support the CoreCon-
nect Bus architecture (CCBA). This feature allows the integration of the PPC405 and
Microblaze cores within the XC2VP30 FPGA. The CCBA is based on a master/slave
relationship with other system devices and supports three types of buses: the pro-
cessor local bus (PLB), the on-chip peripheral bus (OPB), and the device control
register(DCR) bus. The PLB is made for higher speed communication. As a result,
the PPC405 processors can only connect to the PLB. Local Memory (dedicated solely
to a PPC405 core) as well as a DDR SDRAM controller (available to all system de-
vices) can also connect directly to the PLB to allow PPC405 processors high speed
access to main memory. The OPB is slower compared to the PLB, and as a result
is responsible for connecting the majority of system peripherals to any instantiated
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PPC405 or Microblaze processors. Additionally, the OPB is the only bus to which
Microblaze processors can directly connect. The OPB also supports a DDR SDRAM
controller, for systems without a PPC405/PLB. The DCR allows configuration regis-
ters to be removed from a systems memory map in order to improve the bandwidth
of the PLB. Figure 4.1 shows an example of how the various pieces of the CCBA fit
together.
Figure 4.1: Example Embedded System Using Core Connect Bus Architecture
The PLB and OPB can be connected via PLB to OPB and OPB to PLB bridges.
As a result, a PPC405-based system can be implemented to closely resemble the
architecture of a standard personal computer, with the processor and memory residing
on the front-side bus (i.e., the PLB) and the system peripherals residing on the back-
side bus (i.e., the OPB). Additionally, the CCBA allows for multiple instances of these
buses to be created within a single system. As a result, nontraditional computing
architectures can be implemented to suit a particular application.
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4.2.2.1 Xilinx IPCores. Devices are instantiated on the PLB and OPB
as IPCores. IPCores implement specific entities within the embedded system. Any
device, whether it is a processor, memory, memory controller, I/O device, etc. can
be instantiated within a design by adding its corresponding IPCore to the system.
Most IPCores are specifically designed to attach to the PLB and OPB within the
system, so they are easily added to a design. Any processors that exist within the
system communicate to the various IPCores via memory mapped I/O. As an IPCore
is seen as an addressable device within the system, a driver is needed for IPCores
residing on either the OPB or PLB to operate. This applies even if a dedicated
OS is not explicitly loaded onto the embedded system. This is because any software
loaded onto the embedded system is loaded in conjunction with the Standalone Board
Support Package (BSP) unless an OS is specifically specified. The BSP is a set of
modules that allows code to access the on-chip/on-board capabilities, such as caching
and interrupts, in the absence of an OS [62].
Xilinx also includes a utility with their ISE Foundation known as CoreGen. The
CoreGen utility allows an embedded system designer to quickly design an IPCore that
can be used in an embedded system. IPCores created with CoreGen can be designed
to attach to the PLB or OPB. Cores that connect to a system bus through a specific
controller, such as a memory block, can also be implemented. It should be noted
however, that if creating an IPCore to connect to a system bus, a specific driver for
that IPCore must be created as well.
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4.2.3 Software Support. As the development board is based on a Xilinx
FPGA, we are constrained to using mostly Xilinx development tools. For the design
and construction of our embedded designs, the Xilinx ISE Foundation 8.2i and Embed-
ded Development Kit (EDK) 8.2i design environments are used. These environments
are described below. We also briefly touch on the embedded system debugging utility.
4.2.3.1 Xilinx ISE Foundation 8.2i. ISE Foundation 8.2i contains
the tools required to successfully design and implement logic designs for Xilinx FP-
GAs. These tools are tied together using the Xilinx Project Navigator. The Project
Navigator is an interface that provides for the creation and modification of logic de-
signs using the Verilog and/or VHDL hardware description languages. Additionally,
Project Navigator provides access to the entire Xilinx toolchain from design synthesis
to downloading a generated bitstream to the FPGA.
As ISE Foundation includes the basic tools needed to design and implement logic
in Xilinx FPGAs, the ISE is not intended to design and implement complete embedded
systems. Rather, the ISE is specifically suited for designing and implementing custom
logic designs. Designs requiring any kind of processing capability must use the Xilinx
EDK package. However, it should be noted that ISE projects can contain embedded
systems, however, these must be designed using the EDK and imported into the ISE
project. As a number of our primitives use custom logic connected to the inputs and
outputs of an embedded system, we extensively make use of this capability. Detailed
information regarding ISE Foundation 8.2i is located in [60].
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4.2.3.2 Xilinx EDK 8.2i. The Xilinx EDK 8.2i is an environment for
leveraging the tools and resources of the ISE Foundation in a way that provides for
the creation of entire embedded systems. As such, the ISE Foundation is required
for the EDK to be able to operate. Through the EDK, the designer has access to
the library of embedded processing cores and IPCore peripherals used for creating
embedded systems on Xilinx FPGAs. The EDK is a self contained package, and as a
result, a designer does not have to even directly use the ISE (via Project Navigator)
if only creating embedded systems and nothing more. The EDK also includes access
to the Xilinx synthesizer, allowing a system to be translated into a bitstream and
downloaded to the FPGA without having to use the Project Navigator included with
ISE Foundation.
As the EDK provides access to embedded system components, it also provides
an environment for manipulating the parameters and connections of the system. The
interface allows for the designer to control the number and type of processors, buses,
and peripherals within the system and how they are all interconnected. Also provided
is an interface to create, link, build, and debug software intended to execute on the
embedded system. Additionally, the EDK provides access to Xilinx XMD, which
is used to debug software as it executes on the embedded system. More detailed
information regarding the Xilinx EDK platform can be found in [63].
4.2.3.3 Debugging Using Xilinx XMD. For debugging purposes, the
XC2VP30 supports the Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) interface standard. As such,
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Xilinx’s debugging shell known as XMD can connect to any JTAG enabled device
within the system. This includes both the PPC405 and Microblaze processor cores,
however, Microblaze-based designs require that a Microblaze Debug Module (MDM)
IPCore be included in the system for XMD to be able to connect to the Microblaze
processor. As XMD connects to a JTAG supporting device, XMD only operates once
a bitstream has been used to configure the FPGA.
The XMD debugger is a command line driven interface that allows the designer
to input commands in order to control the operation of any processor cores imple-
mented in the current design. Standard debugging capabilities like stepping through
code, reading and writing specific memory locations, etc. are present. For a list of
XMD commands or details on how to use XMD, please refer to [63].
4.3 Linux Implementation
Linux is an open source operating system that has substantial industry support.
Since our concepts are intended to be applied to actual operating environments, Linux
was a natural choice for demonstrating the capabilities of our monitoring concepts.
As a result, we have implemented a Linux-based operating environment on both the
PPC405 and Microblaze processors. However, as complications with the Linux instal-
lations arose and design decisions were made, neither Linux installation is actually
used in conjunction with any of the implemented functional primitives. Despite this,
it is important to mention the work that has been done in regards to creating embed-
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ded systems that can support an environment based on the Linux OS. Such efforts
are described below.
4.3.1 Embedded Linux 2.4. As the PPC405 processor is popular in the
embedded community, an open source version of embedded Linux based on the 2.4
kernel for the PPC405 processor is available. Using information presented in [8, 30,
42], we successfully implemented embedded Linux on a PPC405-based system. The
tutorial detailing how this was done can be found in Appendix B.1. We were able
to partition a compact flash card to contain the boot, swap, and root filesystem
partitions. This provides access to a persistent storage medium similar to a hard
drive. The embedded Linux installation was also able to utilize the ethernet port
for network-based communications. Input and output was entirely console based
via a standard terminal (i.e., serial port communication) interface. As a result, the
Linux environment was very functional. However, for the reasons described in Section
4.2.1.1, the PPC405 is not used in any of our implementations. As a result, this
embedded Linux environment is not implemented in conjunction with any of the
implemented primitive
4.3.2 uCLinux. uCLinux is a version of Linux designed specifically to exe-
cute on processors lacking an MMU, and hence cannot utilize virtual memory. As a
result, uCLinux is the only Linux-based kernel that supports the Xilinx Microblaze
processor. Xilinx Provides the uCLinux sources files for compiling uCLinux for a
Microblaze-based embedded system. Xilinx also provides documents detailing how
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to set up the uCLinux cross-compiling environment and how to create a working
uCLinux kernel in [41,55].
uCLinux provides the same basic capabilities as embedded Linux on the PPC405,
however there are still a number of differences. The most significant of which is that
the Xilinx toolset did not provide the ability for mounting the root filesystem on the
compact flash card. Instead, uCLinux was intended to mount its filesystem to a RAM
disk created from the DDR SDRAM. As a result, all uCLinux kernel files resided in
volatile memory. As certain implementations may have required slight modifications
to the uCLinux kernel, this was not feasible since all changes to the kernel would be
lost if power was ever taken away from the system. It should be mentioned that the
uCLinux Kernel can access and use the compact flash as non-volatile storage, how-
ever, the bootloader provided with the uCLinux development environment did not
support custom commands that would have allowed a root filesystem to be mounted
on the CF card at system start up. As a result, a custom bootloader would have to
be created to support this - something we did not have the experience nor the time
to do. Due to this, uCLinux is not used any of the implementations.
4.4 Functional Primitives
The below sections detail the implementation of a number of primitives proposed
in III. Some of the primitives were not implemented due to limitations inherent in
current computer architectures. For the primitives that were not able to be imple-
92
mented, we discuss how we intend such designs to operate and what capabilities would
be required to implement them.
4.4.1 Execution Policy Enforcement. The execution policy enforcement
module, discussed in Section 3.5.2.1, is implemented using a Microblaze softcore pro-
cessor as the PPU. The Microblaze connects to other peripherals within the system
such as the RS232 UART (serial port), Microblaze Debug Module, etc. via an OPB.
Rather than use DDR SDRAM as main memory, we opted to use 32KB of block
random access memory (BRAM) with an address space ranging from 0x00000000
to 0x00000fff. We chose to use BRAM because programs executing from the DDR
SDRAM must use a bootloader to actually load the program into memory and to
start its execution. As BRAM is created from the FPGA fabric itself, the BRAM
can be initialized when the bitstream configures the FPGA with our design, making
implementation easier. The BRAM itself connects to a Local Memory Bus (LMB)
and is dual ported, with one port connected to the data bus of the Microblaze and
the other port connected to the instruction bus of the Microblaze. Additionally, the
address space of both the instruction and data buses were made to overlap, so the
data and instruction sides can both access the entire 32KB memory space.
As can be seen in Figure 4.2, the SMU is implemented using two modules
- noex mem and noex mem en. Noex mem is a memory that correlates addresses
in the PPU’s memory space to whether or not those addresses are executable or
not. Noex mem en is the enable logic for noex mem. It ensures that the noex mem
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Figure 4.2: Program Counter Monitor Implementation
module is active only when the process it monitors is currently executing. Each
module is constructed of RTL using the VHDL programming language. Please refer
to Appendix A.1 for all VHDL code pertaining to the implementation of the execution
policy monitor.
Noex mem is an instance of BRAM containing 32768 memory locations. The
number of memory locations is a limitation of the platform we are using, as the BRAM
editor of Xilinx’s CoreGen utility only allows the construction of a BRAM core with
a maximum depth of 15 bits. As the memory space where our program will execute
ranges from 0x00000000 to 0x00007fff, the PC of the executing code will only reside
within that range. Therefore, the address range of the PPU’s memory maps to the ad-
dress range of the noex mem module. As a result, we map the PPU’s PC trace signals
(Trace PC) to the address inputs of the noex mem module. Since the Trace PC signal
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consists of 32 bits, but the noex mem module has only 15 address pins, only the 15
least significant bits (Trace PC(14:0)) are connected to the noex mem module. Each
memory location is one bit wide, where “0” corresponds to an executable address and
“1” corresponds to a non-executable address. The output memory output connects
directly to the Microblaze’s external interrupt pin. As a result, if a non-executable
memory location is executed, the noex mem module will trigger an interrupt in the
PPU.
The noex mem en module can be implemented to enable the noex mem mod-
ule in a number of ways. As this implementation is proof of concept, we chose
the noex mem module to always be enabled. As such, the noex mem en module
is configured to output an enable signal when the 17 most significant bits of the PC
(Trace PC(31:15)) all equal “0”. This ensures that noex mem is enabled only when
PCs within the monitored address range are observed.
4.4.2 Multi-context Hardware Monitors. The multi-context monitoring con-
cept relies on revealing the PID of the processes executing on the PPU at a particular
point in time to the SMU. As mentioned in Section 3.5.1, the PID of each process
is managed by the OS scheduler. For the current process, the scheduler points to a
PID value stored in memory. This memory location resides within hardwired pages
of the OS, meaning that the PID of the currently executing process always resides at
a particular physical address. Consequently, that memory location can be monitored
in order to retrieve the current PID and determine the currently executing process.
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Rather than monitor memory itself by reading from a shared memory space, we tap
directly into the main memory bus in order to retrieve the current PID. A schematic
of our implemented multi-context hardware monitors concept is shown in Figure 4.3.
It should be mentioned that while the implementation of our multi-context concept
is displayed in terms of a structural block diagram, this is done purely for ease of
explanation. The actual VHDL code written to implement the SMU in this case was
written at the behavioral level. Connecting the SMU to the PPU was done at the
structural VHDL level, however. Please see Appendix A.2 for all VHDL code related
to this functional primitive.
Figure 4.3: Logical Implementation of PID Retrieval
The PPU is implemented using a Xilinx Microblaze softcore processor with
access to a 32KB local memory via an LMB, which is used to store the instructions
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and data of the test program executing on the Microblaze. The PPU also has access
to 128MB of DDR SDRAM for main memory. Access to memory occurs via an OPB,
which acts as the main memory bus in this implementation. Other peripherals within
the system such as as the RS232 UART (serial port) and general purpose I/O are
also connected to this OPB as well.
We tap directly into the main memory bus that the PPU is connected to in
order to be able to view the PID of an executing process. As the PID capture logic
requires access to the OPB to do this, the PID capture logic can be implemented
as either an IPCore or as RTL. While implementation as an IPCore is most likely
feasible to retrieve the PID from the OPB, we have opted to implement this particular
primitive as RTL. We do this for a number of reasons: 1) ease of implementation,
2) guaranteed performance, and 3) to limit the PPU’s visibility of the PID capture
logic. Implementing the PID capture logic as an IPCore would have required the
creation and use of a hardware driver. As tapping directly into a bus does not require
a driver in this application, we opted to keep the implementation simple by using only
RTL. Using RTL also makes it easier to ensure that the PID capture logic responds
near instantaneously (within a single clock cycle) in a consistent fashion. Lastly,
implementation as an IPCore makes the monitoring logic an addressable peripheral
residing on the OPB. This would have made the PID capture logic visible to the PPU
and would have required explicit communication with the PPU to even operate.
To retrieve the required information from the memory bus, the RTL taps directly
into both the address (OPB ABus) and data (OPB DBus) lines of the OPB. We also
97
tap into the read-not-write (OPB RNW) line, which is used to indicate whether a
read or write operation is occurring on the OPB. The physical address corresponding
to where the PID is stored is hard-coded into the RTL and is signified by the “PID
Mem Register” (PMR) block in Figure 4.3. As we have visibility into the OPB ABus
signal, we compare it to the value stored in the PMR block to determine if the memory
location containing the current PID is being accessed. When accessed, the compare
logic will assert an enable signal to the Current PID Register (CPR). If the OPB RNW
signal is “0” (signifying a write operation) while the enable signal is asserted, the CPR
latches the value currently on the OPB DBus lines. This stored value corresponds
to the PID of the newly executing process and will not change until another context
switch occurs. The newly latched current PID value is then compared with values
in a table containing PIDs corresponding to monitored processes. If the current PID
matches one of the stored PIDs, an interrupt specific to that process is signaled. If
the current PID does not match, no action is taken.
As mentioned in Section 3.5.1, there are three scenarios in which the PID is
useful for monitoring, namely: monitoring a single process among many processes,
monitoring many processes with a single monitor, and monitoring multiple processes
with multiple monitors. Our specific implementation focuses on the latter case, as it
is the most complex. As such, the table of PIDs corresponding to monitored processes
contains two entries - the output of which is a single select signal for each PID. As this
is a proof of concept, these select signals are not connected to actual monitors, but
rather they are used as external interrupts connected the PPU. This allows us to verify
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Figure 4.4: An Example of Monitoring Multiple Processes With Multiple Monitors
the operation of our PID capturing scheme, while not having to actually implement
specific monitors. However, Figure 4.4 does provide an example of an SMU with
multiple monitors monitoring multiple processes. Furthermore, as the Microblaze
only supports a single interrupt natively, an interrupt controller is required for the
Microblaze to be able to discern between the two interrupts.
4.4.3 Peripheral Access Control. The peripheral access control concept pre-
sented in Section 3.5.3 was not implemented on the development platform, however,
we did generate a design that we believe can implement such a monitor. The proposed
peripheral access control monitor is depicted in Figure 4.5.
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In order to determine if a process has the rights to access a particular periph-
eral, two tables are utilized: the Peripheral Access Table (PAT) and the Peripheral
Map Table (PMT). The PAT stores the PID of all monitored processes and correlates
them to a peripheral access code that represents what peripherals within the system
the process is permitted to access. The PMT associates a range of addresses (corre-
sponding to the memory map of the peripherals) to a logic vector (i.e., the peripheral
code). Figure 4.6 depicts an example of both the PAT and PMT. The peripheral
access code is shown as having eight bits, where each bit represents a device in the
system. As a result, eight peripherals would be supported in this system. A value of
“1” denotes that the process is allowed to access the corresponding peripheral and a
“0” denotes no access.
When a process accesses a particular memory address, the PAT and the PMT
output the peripheral access code and the peripheral code, respectively. A logical
AND function is used to compare these two values in order to determine if the current
process is allowed to access the peripheral. If access is allowed, at least one of the
outputs of the AND gate will be “1”. An logical OR function is then used to reduce
the outputs of the AND gate to a single value which is then inverted. If the process
is not allowed to access the particular address, the SMU will trigger an interrupt on
the PPU. Additionally, it should be mentioned that as a process may access addresses
not corresponding to a system peripheral, such addresses must be listed in the PMT
with a corresponding peripheral code containing all “1”s. As a result, such addresses
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Figure 4.5: Planned Peripheral Access Control Implementation
will cause the output of the AND gate to always contain a “1”, thus ensuring that
the SMU will not trigger an interrupt for such memory accesses.
For example, if the process corresponding to PID #1 of the PAT in Figure 4.6
attempts to access a peripheral at the address range 0x0010-0x001f, the operation
would be allowed to continue since performing a logical AND of the access code
(01000000) with the peripheral code (01000000) results in at least one bit value being
“1”. However, if the process with a PID of “1” tried to access the peripheral at 0x0000-
0x000f, the operation would not be allowed as the resulting AND would produce all
“0”s. Additionally, the process corresponding to PID #8 would be allowed to access
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Figure 4.6: PAT and PMT Example
all peripherals within the system as a logical AND of its access code and any peripheral
code will always result in at least one bit value being “1”.
4.4.4 Asymmetrically Shared Main Memory. To realize the asymmetrically
shared memory concept proposed in Section 3.5.4.1, we implement both the PPU and
SMU using Microblaze softcore processors. This is done since the Microblaze can
easily access memory. 128MB of DDR SDRAM is used as the shared memory. Access
to the shared memory is provided by a multi-port memory controller described below.
4.4.4.1 Multi-Port Memory Controller. A Microblaze processor typi-
cally accesses the DDR SDRAM by physically residing on the same OPB as the DDR
SDRAM controller. If multiple processors require access to memory, as in our case,
both processors would reside on the OPB as the DDR SDRAM controller. However,
due to how the DDR SDRAM controller functions, there is no way to allow different
processors to have access to different regions of memory. Moreover, even if the DDR
SDRAM controller did allow this, there is still the issue of creating regions of memory
with varying privilege levels. As a result, the default DDR SDRAM controller that
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Xilinx provides with its development suite cannot be used in this implementation.
Instead, a multi-port memory controller developed by Xilinx is used. This multi-port
memory controller can provide multiple processors access to varying memory regions.
The multi-port memory controller we use is the Multi-Port Memory Controller
2 (MPMC2) developed by Xilinx. It was originally designed for applications requir-
ing high performance access to memory in multiprocessor embedded applications.
Although our application does not necessarily require high performance access to
memory, it does allow us to connect multiple processors to a DDR SDRAM module
and control the region of memory that each processor can access. A diagram of the
MPMC2 is shown in Figure 4.7 below.
Figure 4.7: MPMC2 Basic Organization
The MPMC2 connects to devices within the embedded system through a number
of Port Interface Modules (PIM). Up to 8 PIMs can be utilized at any one time,
and each PIM supports connections to all buses supported by the CoreConnect Bus
architecture, as well as the Xilinx Cache Link (XCL) and Communication Direct
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Memory Access Controller (CDMAC) interfaces. Furthermore, custom made devices
that do not reside on a CoreConnect supported bus can be connected directly to a
PIM using the Native Port Interface (NPI). For more information regarding the design
of the MPMC2 and how to configure a system utilizing it, please refer to [69–71].
4.4.4.2 System Construction. While certain regions of our asymmet-
rically shared main memory concept can apply to a non-contiguous memory space,
as was pointed out in Section 3.5.4.1, for the ease of prototyping, the asymmetrically
shared memory is implemented using contiguous regions. A logical view of the mem-
ory space as seen by both the PPU and the SMU is displayed in Figure 4.8 (not drawn
to scale). In order to make the SMU’s memory space invisible to the PPU (keeping
the SMU as secure as possible), the software on the PPU is limited to addressing only
a 64MB portion of the 128MB of available physical memory space. This is accom-
plished by configuring the PIM connecting the PPU to the MPMC2 to only be able
to access memory ranging from address 0x00000000 to address 0x03ffffff. The SMU
attains visibility into the PPU’s memory space by configuring the PIMs connecting
the SMU to the MPMC2 to have access to the entire physical memory space (i.e.,
ranging from address 0x00000000 to address 0x07ffffff). As such, the SMU has access
to its own contiguous memory space while still being able to access the PPU’s memory
space for security related monitoring. While this serves to distinguish what regions of
memory are visible to the PPU and the SMU, it does not fully provide for the varying
permission levels associated with the different regions.
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Figure 4.8: Memory Map and Permissions as Viewed by the PPU and the SMU
The regions of varying permissions are dependent on how the PPU and SMU are
physically connected to the MPMC2. Figure 4.9 depicts the physical architecture of
our asymmetrically shared memory system. As mentioned previously, the PIM that
connects the PPU’s OPB is configured to only allow access to addresses ranging from
0x00000000 to 0x03ffffff. This is done by connecting both the data and instruction
buses of the PPU to the MPMC2 via a single OPB. In so doing, the PPU has read,
write, and execute privileges for its memory space.
The Harvard architecture of the Microblaze processor is leveraged to create the
different regions of varying permissions that the SMU has access to. As a Harvard
architecture has separate data and instruction buses and memories, any addresses
associated with the data side can only be used to read and write data, while addresses
associated with the instruction side can only be used to read instructions (i.e., such
memory locations are executable). Thus, the permissions of varying regions of memory
are controlled by mapping the instruction and data buses of the SMU to different
regions of memory. This is accomplished by mapping the data and instruction buses
of the SMU to different OPBs. This allows the instruction and data buses of the SMU
105
Figure 4.9: Asymmetrically Shared Memory Implementation
to be connected to separate PIMs - each with a different address range. As such, the
SMU’s data-side PIM is configured to allow access to a 256MB address space. The
first addressable 128MB ranges from 0x00000000 to 0x07ffffff and, as a result, the
SMU has read/write access to the entire shared memory. The second 128MB ranges
from 0x08000000 to 0x0fffffff and allows for peripherals to connect to the SMU’s
data-side OPB. Additionally, the SMU’s instruction-side PIM is configured to allow
access to a 32MB portion of the shared memory ranging from addresses 0x06000000
to 0x07ffffff. As a result, this region of memory allows the SMU to not only read and
write data, but to read instructions as well, making this region of memory executable.
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By configuring our system in this manner, we produce the asymmetrically shared
memory space depicted in Figure 4.8.
4.4.4.3 Application Example - Enhanced CoPilot System. Without
the aid of other primitives, our asymmetrically shared memory system allows the
SMU to have direct access into the physical memory space of the PPU. As a result,
this system can be used to implement the same capabilities as the CoPilot system
that was discussed in Section 2.6.2.2. Whereas CoPilot uses an add-in-card (with its
own dedicated memory) and monitors the production processor’s memory space via a
PCI bus, our implementation sacrifices some of the memory available to the PPU in
order to allow the monitoring coprocessor to reside in the same physical chip package
as the PPU. As is the case with CoPilot, by itself, our implementation would still
be limited to only being able to monitor the pages that are hardwired into memory.
However, this monitoring capability can be extended to the virtual memory space
by also implementing our MMU co-opting or multiple MMU concepts presented in
Sections 4.4.5 and 4.4.6, respectively. Additionally, as the SMU resides at the same
logical level as the PPU, the SMU has the ability to exert control over the PPU.
As a result, using the asymmetrically shared main memory in the manner proposed
here can remedy one of the largest shortcomings of the CoPilot system. Additionally,
the asymmetrically shared main memory allows the SMU to have access to main
memory without having to contend with other system peripherals - the constraining
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factor causing CoPilot to perform monitoring only every 30 seconds. As a result, our
approach could provide monitoring at a faster rate than that of the CoPilot system.
4.4.5 Co-opted Memory Management Unit. As we do not have access to
a softcore processor containing an MMU, the MMU co-opting concept, presented in
Section 3.5.4.2, cannot actually be implemented at this time. Rather, we discuss what
we believe will be required in order to provide such a capability.
4.4.5.1 Hardware Support. The SMU gains visibility into the memory
space of the currently executing process by querying the PPU’s MMU to translate a
virtual address provided by the SMU. This will result in the retrieval of the data at
the specified virtual address. The architecture we propose for doing this is shown in
Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.10: Proposed Co-opted Memory Management Unit Architecture
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In order for the SMU to be able to determine what process is accessing memory
and where, two pieces of state information are needed - the PID and the effective
address. The PID indicates what process the PPU is currently executing, allowing
the SMU to determine if the code currently executing corresponds to a monitored
process. The PID can be gathered via methods presented in 4.4.2. The effective
address corresponds to the address within the current virtual memory space, which
is used to indicate what virtual memory address is currently being accessed by the
PPU. Gaining insight into both of these pieces of state information can give the SMU
visibility into how the PPU is executing a particular process, however it does not
provide the SMU itself with visibility into the current virtual memory space.
Visibility into the virtual memory space of the currently executing process is
provided by co-opting the PPU’s MMU. When a monitored process accesses a virtual
address containing a key data structure, a control signal is first sent from the SMU
to the PPU notifying the PPU that its MMU is about to be co-opted. At this point,
any memory operations currently in progress are allowed to complete so as to not
corrupt any data. As the SMU will be sending a virtual address to the PPU’s MMU
and an address (in the form of data) in return, the SMU must have direct connections
from its address and data lines to the PPU’s MMU. As a result, when the MMU is
co-opted by the SMU, the address and data lines of the SMU connect to the PPU’s
MMU, rather than to the memory bus. Additionally, at this time the PPU will have
no access to the MMU. As a result, either the entire PPU must be halted or the PPU
can continue execution so long as no memory access instructions are executed. It
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should be noted that this will most likely require a change to the control logic of the
PPU as the MMU may not function if the rest of the PPU is halted.
Now that the SMU has exclusive access to the PPU’s MMU, the SMU can send
the monitored virtual address to the MMU. As the MMU is still linked to the virtual
memory space of the currently executing process, the MMU will translate the virtual
address to a corresponding physical address which is then transmitted to the SMU.
It should be noted, however, that the PPU’s MMU must be modified to be able to
return the physical address, as the MMU usually performs translation for specific
memory operations. Once the SMU has received the corresponding physical address,
the SMU sends a control signal that relinquishes the SMU’s control of the MMU and
resumes the PPU’s execution of the process.
Once the SMU has retrieved the physical address of the data structure in ques-
tion, the physical address can be used by the SMU to access the desired data and
any necessary checks can be performed. This assumes that the SMU has visibility
onto the PPU’s physical memory space. This can be done using a method like the
asymmetrically partitioned main memory concept described in 3.5.4.1.
4.4.5.2 Software Support. When the SMU co-opts the PPU’s MMU,
the PPU can either halt entirely, or execute instructions until a memory access in-
struction is encountered. As this is controlled in hardware by the SMU, the code
being executed on the PPU should have no awareness of the MMU’s ability to be
co-opted. Thus, no changes should be required to the software/OS executing on the
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PPU to enable such a capability. However, as the the SMU needs to be able to access
a device (i.e., the MMU) in a particular way, this will most likely be implemented
by a new instruction made specifically for co-opting another processor’s PPU. As a
result, the OS/software executing on the SMU must be aware of such a capability,
but the changes required to do so should not be very extensive.
4.4.6 SMU with Multiple MMUs. The multiple MMU concept, presented
in Section 3.5.4.3, cannot actually be implemented at this time. This is due to the
architectural limitations of the processors available to us. As a result, we discuss what
we believe will be required in order to provide visibility into the virtual memory space
of monitored PPU processes by incorporating multiple MMUs into the SMU.
4.4.6.1 Hardware Support. In Intel’s IA-32 architecture, an MMU
accesses the virtual memory space of a particular process by updating Control Register
3 (CR3) with a physical address that points to the page directory of a particular
process [25]. This allows any memory accesses by the currently executing process to
have access to its virtual memory space. The CR3 register is updated implicitly when
the OS scheduler performs a context switch to begin execution of another process,
however, it can also be explicitly updated via an instruction integrated in executing
code [25]. As a result, we can specifically control what virtual memory space the MMU
accesses to perform virtual address translation so long as the address corresponding
to the desired page directory is known. We believe this capability can be leveraged in
such a way as to allow the SMU to have access into the virtual memory space of the
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PPU. In order to do so, however, a number of architectural changes need to be made
at the processor level.
Unlike the MMU co-opting concept detailed in 4.4.5, our multiple MMU concept
provides the SMU visibility into the PPU’s virtual memory space by using the SMU’s
own hardware resources rather than tapping into the hardware resources of the PPU.
As a result, the architectural changes are primarily targeted at the processor being
used to implement the SMU. The most blatant of these changes is the addition of
at least another MMU to the SMU. Thus, the SMU contains a single primary MMU
and one or more secondary MMUs. The primary MMU is used for servicing memory
accesses made by the monitoring code executing on the SMU itself. As such, the
primary MMU fetches instructions and data to execute code executing on the SMU,
thereby fulfilling the same role as an MMU in any other processor supporting virtual
memory. The secondary MMU(s) are only used to gain access to the virtual memory
space of PPU processes, therefore, the secondary MMU(s) do not fetch executable
instructions. This helps to prevent the SMU from being compromised as potential
malicious instructions gathered from the PPU’s memory space cannot be executed by
the SMU.
As the primary MMU and secondary MMU(s) perform different roles within the
SMU, added instruction support is required. The obvious instructions to be added
are load and store instructions that specifically leverage the secondary MMU(s). For
this to occur, additional load-store memory access units must be added to the SMU’s
112
pipeline. These additional load-store units only operate on instructions that leverage
the secondary MMU(s).
Although multiple MMUs are used to access the PPU’s virtual memory space,
virtual memory maps to physical memory. Therefore, it goes without saying that
the SMU must have access to the PPU’s physical memory space. As a result, the
SMU and the PPU must share memory. For the protection of the SMU itself, the
shared memory should adhere to the model discussed in 3.5.4.1. This provides the
SMU access to the PPU’s memory space, while keeping the SMU’s memory space
invisible to the PPU. As mentioned previously, since a secondary MMU cannot fetch
instructions for the SMU, the SMU is physically protected from executing possibly
malicious code that may be retrieved from the PPU’s memory space as a result of
monitoring. This provides for non-executable regions of the asymmetrically shared
memory model to be implemented.
While we have described the hardware-level changes that must be made in order
to gain visibility into the PPU’s virtual memory space via our multiple MMU concept,
we have not discussed the hardware support that is required for the SMU to know
when to leverage that visibility. The SMU (invisibly) gathers PID and effective ad-
dress state information from the PPU via hardware-based methods discussed in 4.4.2.
This state information is used by the SMU to determine when a particular process
is executing on the PPU and when that process accesses specific virtual addresses.
It should also be mentioned that, as the page directory address is different for every
process, there is a 1:1 mapping between the PID and the page directory address. As a
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result, a page directory address can be used to determine the identity of the currently
executing process. This assumes that the SMU has knowledge of the particular page
directory address in question as well as knowledge of what process it corresponds
to. For the SMU to acquire information regarding a process’ page directory, software
support is needed. Software changes are also required in order for the SMU to be
able to monitor currently non-executing processes. These software-level changes are
discussed below.
4.4.6.2 Software Support. While the multiple MMU concept provides
the SMU visibility into the PPU’s virtual memory space, this is dependent on the
SMU having the address of the page directory corresponding to the desired virtual
memory space. As each process has a unique virtual memory space, each process’ page
directory address is unique. This address can be explicitly communicated to the PPU
when a monitored process is created. This communication should only be handled
by a kernel level process on the PPU. Furthermore, the kernel should be in a known
trusted state, so it can be assured that the value has not been altered for malicious
purposes. This is similar to the creation of a monitored process in CuPIDs [59].
Although multiple MMUs can provide for monitoring processes that are not cur-
rently executing, the SMU must have information regarding whether the process(es)
in question are on either the ready, I/O, or waiting queues. The concept of queues,
however, is a software-level construct that is controlled by the OS, and as a result,
cannot be determined at the hardware level. Thus, changes to the OS executing on
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the PPU are required to notify the SMU when a particular process goes on a cer-
tain queue. This requires some explicit communication from the PPU to the SMU.
As the OS scheduler coordinates the processes on the queues, it is most likely that
the scheduler itself would control such communication as it schedules processes for
execution. It should also be noted that although the ability to monitor processes not
currently executing relies on software-level changes, for security purposes, dedicated
logic connecting the PPU and the SMU should be used, rather than communicating
this over the front-side bus.
Changes pertaining to the SMU’s OS/software that help to enable the multiple
MMU concept are minimal compared to the changes required for the PPU’s OS/-
software. As mentioned previously, new instructions are required for the SMU to be
able to leverage the secondary MMU(s). Although these instructions are physically
implemented as logic in the SMU, the OS/software executing on the SMU must be
aware of these new instructions in order to take advantage of them. As a result, the
software executing on the SMU needs to be coded with these instructions in mind.
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V. Testing and Results
I
n this chapter we present the testing methodology and results of the implemented
primitives. As the proposed functional primitives are implemented as proof of
concept, simulation and testing are primarily functional in nature. For this reason,
we integrate the testing methodology, any simulations, and implementation results
into a single chapter. It should be noted, however, that a number of the primitives
were not implemented and/or tested. In such cases, we explain the reasons that
attributed to this and comment on the expected results.
5.1 Execution Policy Enforcement Module
The execution policy enforcement module was successfully implemented on the
development platform. As such, logic simulation and actual testing was able to be
performed, the results of which are described below.
5.1.1 Testing Methodology. Testing for this primitive is functional in order to
show proof of concept. As described in Section 4.4.1, the execution policy enforcement
module monitors the PC of the code currently executing on a Microblaze processor.
Monitoring is performed by the non-executable memory module, the output of which
acts as an interrupt for the Microblaze processor. As a result, there are a number of
cases that we test to ensure proper operation of execution policy enforcement logic.
These test cases are described below.
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1. Executable Instruction: This case tests the output of the of the execution policy
enforcement module when an executable instruction executes. If implemented
correctly, the interrupt will not be triggered.
2. Executable Instruction Follows an Executable Instruction: This case tests the
output of the execution policy enforcement module when an executable instruc-
tion executes after an executable instruction. If implemented correctly, the
interrupt will not be triggered.
3. Non-Executable Instruction Follows an Executable Instruction: This case tests
the output of the execution policy enforcement module when a non-executable
instruction executes after an executable instruction. If implemented correctly,
the interrupt will be triggered.
4. Non-executable Instruction Follows a Non-executable instruction: This case
tests the output of the execution policy enforcement module when a non-executable
instruction executes after a non-executable instruction. If implemented cor-
rectly, the interrupt will continue to be triggered.
5. Executable Instruction Follows a Non-executable Instruction: This case tests
the output of the execution policy enforcement module when an executable in-
struction executes after a non-executable instruction. If implemented correctly,
the interrupt will no longer be triggered.
5.1.2 Simulation. Simulation of the execution policy enforcement module
was performed only for the logic implementing the monitoring mechanism. The em-
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bedded system connected to this logic in the implementation was not part of the
simulation, since the functionality of the execution policy enforcement module can be
tested without the use of the embedded system. As such, the logic has two inputs -
clock and pc bits, and one output - mb int. The clock signal is self explanatory. The
pc bits signal represents the program counter trace that is output from the Microblaze
processor during execution. The mb int signal is the interrupt signal used to signal
when a non-executable instruction has been reached. The waveforms corresponding
to these signals can be found in Figure 5.1 below.
Figure 5.1: Execution Policy Enforcement Simulation Result
The simulation uses a 50ns clock cycle. The pc bits test waveform input is
made to resemble a malicious event. This is done by the waveform incrementing
the pc bits value as if it were executing sequential code that suddenly jumps to a
malicious region of code. This is represented by pc bits changing from 20 to 80 in the
simulation waveform above. The “malicious code” executes by the pc bits waveform
incrementing from 80 to 92. The pc bits value then changes to 24, representing a
return to the valid stream of instructions.
The non-executable memory module (noex mem) is initialized for all program
counter values 80 and above to be non-executable. As a result, any PC value of 80 and
above should set the mb int signal. As can be seen in Figure 5.1, this is confirmed
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as mb int raises from “0” to “1” when pc bits becomes 80. Subsequent malicious
instructions (i.e., pc bits ranges from 84 to 92) continue to keep mb int set. The
mb int signal then returns to “0” when the “malicious code” returns to the original
stream of instructions via the pc bits value being 24. It is also important to note that
the simulation shows that the execution policy enforcement module can respond in
under one clock cycle of receiving a PC value.
5.1.3 Implementation Results. Similar to the simulation above, we created
code to test the the functionality of the execution policy enforcement module. The
code we used is as follows:
//interrupt service routine//
void noex_int_handler(void *arg) {
print("No-Execute Memory Location Reached!");
}
int main (void) {
microblaze_enable_interrupts();
print("-- Entering main() --\r\n");
print("-- About to jump to non-executable memory location--\r\n");
__asm__("bri 0x0400");
}
print("-- Exiting main() --\r\n");
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return 0;
}
As can be seen, the code consists of two “print” statements, followed by a “bri”
inline assembly instruction, followed by a final “print” statement. The code is simple,
but is intended to work in the same way as the simulation’s pc bits waveform. The
“bri” instruction is an unconditional branch to the specified address. Thus, as soon
as this instruction is reached the PC should branch to address 0x0400. We set the
jump to this address because this memory location resided just outside of the code’s
text segment. This ensures that the addresses that we deem as “non-executable” are
not real instructions that are supposed to be executed by the code. Additionally,
the noex mem VHDL module was configured to mark addresses 0x0390 to 0x0500
as non-executable. Thus, when the unconditional branch updates the PC to 0x0400,
the noex mem module should output an interrupt, which the Microblaze receives,
signalling the Microblaze to execute the code located in the interrupt service routine
at the top of the code segment.
Upon executing this body of code, however, the hyperterminal (used to display
the output) displayed the first two “print” statements in the main body of the code
over and over in an infinite loop. Other addresses outside of the text segment were
attempted, but the same result was observed. This is most likely being caused by
an exception within the Xilinx standalone BSP that gets loaded to the FPGA along
with this code. We also attempted to jump to addresses within the code’s text seg-
ment, however, this resulted in crashing the program. As a last resort, we modified
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the configuration of the noex mem module to mark the entire text segment as non-
executable so as to make sure instructions being executed would trigger an interrupt.
Re-executing the code resulted in the interrupt service routine being executed in an
infinite loop. Although it was shown to work under a less than optimal test case,
we were able to show that the implemented execution policy enforcement module
functions properly.
5.2 Multi-context Hardware Monitors
The multi-context monitoring concept was able to be implemented on the de-
velopment platform. As such, simulation was performed, however, actual testing was
not able to be conducted. In this section, we describe our testing methodology, sim-
ulation results, and the issues encountered that prevented us from performing actual
functional testing.
5.2.1 Testing Methodology. Testing for this primitive is functional in order
to show proof of concept. As described in Section 4.4.2, the multi-context monitoring
design monitors a specific memory address for specific PID values in order to determine
the currently executing process. As not all attacks change the control flow of the
targeted program, the address where the PID value resides and the values of the
monitored PIDs themselves are all arbitrary in our testing. Similar to how execution
policy enforcement was tested in Section 5.1, interrupts connected to the Microblaze
processor (i.e., the PPU) are used to notify when a PID value matches that of a
monitored process.
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Testing consists of a number of memory accesses that read and write varying
data values to a number of memory addresses to demonstrate the functionality of
the multi-context monitoring implementation. As a result, the following cases will be
tested in the order in which they are listed below.
1. System Initialization: This case tests the output of the interrupts when the
system initializes (i.e., the reset condition). If implemented correctly, neither
interrupt will be triggered.
2. Writing to an Arbitrary Memory Location: This case tests the output of the
interrupts when a write request is made to an address other than the address
where the PID is stored. If implemented correctly, neither interrupt will be
triggered.
3. Reading From an Arbitrary Memory Location: This case tests the output of the
interrupts when a write request is made to an address other than the address
where the PID is stored. If implemented correctly, neither interrupt will change
from their previous state.
4. Reading the PID as a Non-monitored Process Executes: This case tests the
output of the interrupts when a memory location is read and a monitored process
is not executing (i.e., when both interrupts are “0”). If implemented correctly,
neither interrupt will change from their previous state.
5. Writing the First Monitored PID to the PID Address: This case tests the output
of the interrupts when a PID corresponding to Monitored Process #1 is written
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to the PID address. If implemented correctly, interrupt A will be triggered,
while interrupt B will be not be triggered.
6. Writing the Second Monitored PID to the PID Address: This case tests the
output of the interrupts when a PID corresponding to Monitored Process #2 is
written to the PID address. If implemented correctly, interrupt A will not be
triggered, while interrupt B will be triggered.
7. Reading the PID as a Monitored Process Executes: This case tests the output
of the interrupts when a memory location is read while a monitored process is
executing (i.e., when one interrupt signal is “1”). If implemented correctly, both
interrupt signals should not change from their previous state.
8. Writing a Monitored PID to an Arbitrary Memory Location as a the Other
Monitored Process Executes: This case tests the output of the interrupts when
a value matching the PID of a monitored process is written to a memory location
while the other monitored process is executing (i.e., when one interrupt signal
is “1”). If implemented correctly, both interrupt signals should not change from
their previous state.
9. Writing a Non-monitored PID after a Monitored Process has Been Executing:
This case tests the output of the interrupts when a non-monitored PID is written
to the PID address directly following the execution of a monitored process. If
implemented correctly, neither interrupt will be triggered.
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Although this is not an exhaustive test set, the number and type of tests chosen
are sufficient to prove the functionality of the multi-context monitoring implementa-
tion.
5.2.2 Simulation. Simulating the implementation of the multi-context mon-
itoring concept was performed only for the logic implementing the monitor. The
embedded system connected to this logic in our implementation was not part of the
simulation, since the functionality of the multi-context monitoring can be tested with-
out the use of the embedded system containing the PPU.
Figure 5.2: Multicontext Monitors Simulation Result
Figure 5.2 displays the simulation waveforms for our multi-context monitoring
implementation. Inputs include clock, addr, data, reset, and rnw. The addr and data
waves represent the address and data lines of the OPB respectively. The rnw wave is
the write enable line of the OPB, where a “0” represents a write to a particular memory
address and a “1” represents a read from a particular memory address. The clock and
reset signals are self explanatory. Outputs include int a and int b which represent
the interrupts for Monitored Process #1 and Monitored Process #2, respectively.
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Each of the test cases mentioned previously in Section 5.2.1 correlate directly
to a 150ns slice of time in the simulation depicted in Figure 5.2. The address where
the PID resides is designated as 1024. All other addresses are arbitrary. Data values
representing PIDs range from 99-101, however, 100 corresponds to Monitored Pro-
cess #1 and 101 corresponds to Monitored Process #2. By following the test cases
described above, it can be seen that the all test cases are fulfilled. As a result, this
simulation has shown that the implementation of our multi-context monitoring con-
cept can determine the currently executing process and keeps track of it in the event
of other kinds of memory accesses. It should also be mentioned that the interrupt
signals - int a and int b - both update in under one clock cycle when the PID changes.
5.2.3 Implementation Results. Although we succeeded in implementing our
multi-context monitoring concept on the development platform, we were not able to
perform any real-world test cases. This derived from difficulties with the development
tools which did not allow for the design to be implemented given our time constraints.
Furthermore, once a change is made to a design, the bitstream used to program
the FPGA must be regenerated. Designs including an embedded Microblaze (as
this implementation does) required 20-25 minutes to generate the FPGA bitstream.
Although subsequent bitstream generations are faster than the original bitstream
generation (as some steps in the process do not need to be repeated), the debug
cycle is still long at 15 - 20 minutes to modify a bitstream. This somewhat faster
bitstream generation could not always be taken advantage of, however, as issues with
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the development tools required that the project be “cleaned” often, resulting in all
steps of bitstream regeneration having to be redone. This increased the average time
required for a single debug cycle.
5.3 Peripheral Access Control
The peripheral access control concept, described in 4.4.3, was not able to be im-
plemented on the development platform. This was not due to any particular difficulty
introduced by this monitoring concept, but rather, it can be attributed simply to time
constraints. Despite not being able to implement this concept, we still discuss the
expected results of this primitive based upon the results of other primitives tested.
5.3.1 Expected Results. The peripheral access control concept uses the
same techniques to gather the PID as the multi-context monitoring implementation
presented in Section 4.4.2. As it was shown in Section 5.2 that the PID could be
captured, there should be no reason as to why such a method would not work for the
purpose of implementing peripheral access control. Additionally, the peripheral access
table and the peripheral map table proposed for this concept can be implemented in
much the same way as the execution policy enforcement module that is described in
Section 4.4.1. As the execution policy enforcement module was shown to work in both
simulation and implementation in 5.1, it is safe to assume that the peripheral access
table and the peripheral map table can be implemented in a similar manner.
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Furthermore, despite simulations showing the execution policy enforcement and
multi-context monitoring implementations responding in under one clock cycle, we
cannot know for certain how fast peripheral access control will respond without im-
plementation and simulation/testing. However, we expect peripheral access control
to respond in no more than a few clock cycles as the concept is only mildly more
complex than the techniques used to implement execution policy enforcement and
multi-context monitoring.
5.4 Asymmetrically Shared Main Memory
The design of the asymmetrically shared main memory concept, detailed in
Section 4.4.4, was successfully implemented on our development platform. Time con-
straints, however, prevented testing from being able to be performed. Since the im-
plementation of this primitive is based on using a Microblaze as the SMU, not RTL as
is the case with the other primitives discussed thus far, simulation was not performed.
Accordingly, we present our planned testing methodology and the expected results
below.
5.4.1 Testing Methodology. Implementation of the asymmetrically shared
main memory concept, detailed in Section 4.4.4, a number of memory regions with
varying permission levels. Depending on the processor accessing memory at a given
time, each region has different permissions that dictate what kind of operations can
be performed. As a result, testing is functional in nature and focuses on ensuring that
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the permission level of the various regions are correctly enforced for both the PPU
and the SMU. We describe the applicable test cases below.
1. PPU Accessing PPU Memory Space: This case tests whether or not the PPU
can read data, write data, and execute instructions from its own memory space.
If implemented correctly, the PPU will be able to read, write, and execute from
its own memory space.
2. PPU Accessing SMU’s Memory Space: This case tests whether or not the PPU
can access the SMU’s memory space using any type of memory access (read-
/write/execute). If implemented correctly, the PPU will not be able to access
the SMU’s memory space.
3. SMU Accessing SMU Exclusive Memory Space: This case tests whether or not
the SMU can read data, write data, and execute instructions from the SMU
Exclusive memory region. If implemented correctly, the SMU will be able to
read, write, and execute from this region of memory.
4. SMU Reading/Writing Safe SMU Exclusive Memory Space: This case tests
whether or not the SMU can read and write to the Safe SMU Exclusive memory
region. If implemented correctly, the SMU will be able to read from and write
to this region of memory.
5. SMU Executing From Safe SMU Exclusive Memory Space: This case tests
whether or not the SMU can execute instructions from the Safe SMU Exclusive
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memory region. If implemented correctly, the SMU will not be able to execute
from this region of memory.
6. SMU Reading/Writing PPU Shared Memory Space: This case tests whether
or not the SMU can read and write to the PPU Shared Memory region. If
implemented correctly, the SMU will be able to read from and write to this
region of memory.
7. SMU Executing From PPU Shared Memory Spaces: This case tests whether or
not the SMU can execute instructions from the PPU Shared Memory region. If
implemented correctly, the SMU will not be able to execute from this region of
memory.
5.4.2 Implementation Results. The asymmetrically shared main memory
was successfully implemented on the development platform, however, testing was not
performed due to time constraints. Despite this, we are confident that our implemen-
tation of an asymmetrically shared memory will function correctly. This is because
the various regions of our asymmetrically shared memory concept are all enforced in
hardware. For example, the PPU connects to the MPMC2 via a single OPB, while the
SMU connects to the MPMC2 via two independent and separate OPBs - one for the
instruction-side and the other for the data-side. As we have set the PPU’s accessible
memory range to not include the SMU’s memory space, it is not possible for the PPU
to even address the SMU’s memory space. Thus, by virtue of how memory mapping
works and how we have leveraged the Harvard architecture of the Microblaze proces-
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sor to implement the regions of varying permissions, we expect with a high level of
certainty that the asymmetrically shared main memory implementation will function
correctly.
5.5 Memory Management Unit Co-opting
The MMU co-opting concept, detailed in Section 4.4.5, is a large departure
from traditional computer architecture design; no processor available, either in the
development platform or the computing industry, contains such a capability. As
a result, the MMU co-opting concept was not able to be implemented, either in
simulation nor in physical hardware. However, we do realize that our MMU concept
has a number of benefits as well as limitations. These are described below.
5.5.1 Benefits and Limitations. The MMU co-opting technique can theo-
retically provide the SMU access to the virtual memory space of a PPU process at
the hardware level. As a result, the SMU, not the PPU, controls the MMU co-opting
process. This, combined with the design decision to allow the SMU to co-opt the
PPU’s MMU only when the PPU is either not using the MMU or the SMU has halted
the PPU, keeps the SMU invisible from the PPU. Additionally, as this is being im-
plemented at the hardware level, this method can be used to gain insight into state
information unable to be gathered at the hardware level previously. This allows for
efficient parallel monitoring that can be performed in real-time as code executes on
the PPU. As a result, overhead associated with monitoring is expected to be reduced
compared to software-based methods. Additionally, as the SMU leverages the physi-
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cal addresses it retrieves from the PPU’s MMU, this assumes that the SMU not have
an MMU of its own. This makes the MMU co-opting concept ideal for situations
where chip area is at a premium, while still providing visibility into a process’ virtual
memory space.
Co-opting the PPU’s MMU is not without its limitations, however. One such
limitation of our MMU co-opting concept is that the control logic required to im-
plement such a capability may be significant. Additionally, as data in question is
accessed by the SMU after the PPU resumes operation, the physical address corre-
sponding to the data structure in question may change. This is a result of the dynamic
nature of virtual memory. To remedy this, the physical address of the data structure
in question should be retrieved every time the process begins and when the virtual
address in question is accessed. This could lead to inefficiencies as the SMU would be
requesting translation for a virtual address whose corresponding physical address has
not changed. This could be remedied by either retrieving the data when the MMU is
co-opted or by making the SMU access the physical memory address before the PPU
is allowed to resume operation. However, as the PPU may be disabled while the SMU
co-opts the MMU, both of these methods could increase the amount of time that the
PPU must remain halted, decreasing the performance of the PPU. Such performance
is dependent on the how often the SMU co-opts the MMU and how often the moni-
tored process on the PPU must access memory. Additionally, depending on the data
being monitored by the SMU, the data may have been moved to external memory.
As the PPU’s OS keeps track of where such data would reside, the co-opted MMU
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would have no access to such data since the PPU (and the OS) would be halted while
the SMU co-opts the PPU.
5.6 Multiple Memory Management Units
As with MMU co-opting, incorporating multiple MMUs into the SMU as pre-
sented in Section 4.4.6 is a significant departure from traditional computer architec-
ture design. This combined with time constraints did not allow for either a simulation
model or implementation to be created. Even without this, we can discuss a number
of the the apparent benefits and limitations of the proposed multiple MMU approach
below.
5.6.1 Benefits and Limitations. As with the MMU co-opting concept dis-
cussed in Section 5.5, implementing multiple MMUs can provide the SMU visibility
into the PPU’s virtual memory space. Doing so by integrating multiple MMUs can
provide a number of benefits. The most notable of these benefits is the ability to
monitor the processes that are not currently executing. This can provide for run-time
trustability as this method could be used to ensure a process is in a known trusted
state every time before it is placed on the PPU to be executed. Moreover, an SMU
with multiple MMUs can also allow for monitoring in different scenarios. Examples
of such scenarios include monitoring a process on the I/O queue for buffer overflow
attacks or monitoring multiple processes on a waiting queue to check for deadlock
conditions.
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Monitoring the PPU’s virtual memory space with multiple MMUs also shifts
the resource burden from the PPU to the SMU. As a result, the PPU does not need
to undergo many architectural changes, especially when compared to the changes to
the PPU required to implement MMU co-opting. Moreover, as the SMU monitors
the PPU’s virtual memory space using its own hardware resources, the performance
of the PPU should not be affected, as would most likely be the case with MMU co-
opting (due to having to halt the processor’s execution when co-opting the MMU).
As a result, impacts on system usability should be minimal.
Despite all of the benefits that an SMU with multiple MMUs can provide, a
number of limitations still exist. While having the SMU utilize its own resources may
allow for better PPU performance and fewer modifications to the PPU’s architecture,
the SMU has to undergo a drastic architectural change that may require a large
amount of added complexity to the SMU’s architecture. This may not turn out to
be the case, however, as the SMU may not need to be very powerful for the kinds of
monitoring it will be performing, but it is still a notable limitation nonetheless.
A number of the capabilities provided by the SMU having multiple MMUs are
also dependent on a level of PPU software support. State information, such as the
page directory address of different processes or information regarding what processes
reside on which OS queues, must be explicitly communicated from the PPU to the
SMU. This explicit communication should be kept to a minimum. This is because
explicit communication not only means that the PPU must be aware of the SMU’s
presence, but that some of the SMU’s capabilities may be dependent on the PPU’s
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potentially untrustable software. If not handled in a careful manner, such as the PPU
only explicitly communicating to the SMU when the PPU’s OS is in a known trusted
state, then it will be easer for the SMU to be compromised.
Another limitation that must be considered is that the OS controls the paging
of data that no longer resides in memory. As part of paging is controlled by the
operating system for pages residing in external storage (no longer in main memory),
the OS may have protections to keep data belonging to a currently non-executing
process from being accessed.
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VI. Conclusion
I
n this Chapter, we present the key findings of our research. Additionally, we
describe the research areas we would like to explore in the future.
6.1 Conclusions
Our research focuses on moving security-related monitoring tasks from software
to dedicated hardware in an effort to increase overall system security and usabil-
ity compared to software-based security methods. This is realized via a number of
hardware-based functional primitives that gather and process state information in
ways not previously possible at the hardware-level. These primitives leverage a novel
computing architecture that is based on a contemporary shared memory multipro-
cessing model. In doing this, we are able to break through a number of limitations
imposed by the current computing model, resulting in framework upon which real-
time security policy compliance monitoring can be performed in parallel and for a
wide variety of computing environments. As we show that performing security pol-
icy compliance monitoring in this manner can increase performance, efficiency, and
security over software-based methods, we validate our research hypothesis. The key
findings that allow us to make this claim are presented below.
6.1.1 Improved Time-to-Detect. Our research has shifted security-related
monitoring tasks from software to dedicated hardware. Thus, security monitoring can
be performed in parallel as code executes on the monitored processor. This, combined
with gathering state information at the hardware level, provides for real-time security
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policy compliance monitoring. As a result, our research allows for faster time-to-
detect than software-based methods. Thus, damage caused by malicious events can
be minimized or prevented altogether.
6.1.2 Hardness of the Monitoring System. Software is the primary means
of attacking a system. Therefore, we designed the architecture to tightly couple the
monitoring hardware to the monitored system, while minimizing software coupling as
much as possible. This allows the monitoring hardware to gather context-rich state
information, but do so with a minimal amount of explicit communication from the
monitored system. There are two key benefits that come from this: 1) the attack
surface of the monitoring hardware is decreased, making the monitoring hardware
more secure, and 2) The monitoring hardware can continue to function, albeit possibly
in a diminished capacity, in the event that the monitored system is compromised.
Thus, the monitoring system itself is highly resistent to being compromised.
6.1.3 Displaced Security Workload. Our research shifts the burden of per-
forming security monitoring tasks to dedicated hardware. Thus, security monitoring
can be performed in parallel as code executes on the monitored processor. As a re-
sult, little to no overhead (due to security monitoring) is incurred by the processor
executing the monitored code. This increases the performance of the monitored sys-
tem compared to software-based approaches. Therefore, little to no impact on the
system’s usability occurs.
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6.1.4 Novel Hardware-based Monitoring Techniques. Our architecture al-
lows state information previously not available at the hardware level to be gathered.
This increases the types of inputs available to the monitoring system over previously
proposed hardware-based security monitoring systems. Moreover, this new state in-
formation enables novel monitoring capabilities at the hardware level. We describe
the benefits of such capabilities below.
• Multi-context Monitoring in Hardware: By monitoring the the PID of the cur-
rently executing process, monitors implemented in hardware can now discern
between different processes. This allows hardware-based monitors to be able
to operate in dynamic, multiprogrammed (e.g., general purpose) environments,
rather than be limited to more static (e.g., embedded and application specific)
environments. As a result, we provide an alternative to anomaly detection
(which is prone to false positives) when performing hardware-based monitoring
in more complex computing environments.
• Virtual Memory Introspection: The MMU co-opting and the Multiple MMU
primitives can be used to monitor the virtual memory space of the process
currently executing on the monitored processor. This allows both kernel-level
and user-level processes to be monitored. Such a capability was previously only
available via software-based monitoring techniques, which introduced overhead
and was vulnerable to attack. By monitoring the virtual memory space via
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hardware, the performance, time-to-detect, and monitoring system security is
improved compared to similar software-based methods.
• Monitoring Non-executing Processes: Implementing monitoring hardware using
multiple MMUs enables the monitoring of any process’ virtual memory space;
including the memory space of processes not currently executing (i.e., processes
residing in one of the OS’s waiting queues). This provides completely new se-
curity monitoring capabilities. Such capabilities include, but are not limited to,
ensuring a process is trustable throughout its entire run-time, bad I/O detec-
tion, and run-time deadlock detection - all of which benefit the security-related
monitoring field.
6.1.5 Monitoring System Flexibility. Many of the primitives created through
the course of our research provide complementary monitoring capabilities. Thus, as
the monitoring system (i.e., the SMU) is seen as a black box with respect to the
rest of the system, the monitoring system can consist of a combination of primitives.
As a result, the monitoring system is flexible and allows security to be tailored to a
particular system’s specific security needs.
6.1.6 Monitoring System Extensibility. Since the monitoring system (i.e.,
the SMU) can be viewed as a black box with respect to the rest of the system, any
primitive can be implemented, providing it adheres the guidelines of the architecture.
As a result, the primitives that can be implemented in this architecture are not limited
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to the primitives developed in this research. Thus, new primitives can be developed
in the future to enable new forms of security related monitoring.
6.1.7 Improved Range of Monitoring Granularity. Our primitives can allow
monitoring granularity ranging from the individual instruction level to the process
level. Thus, this research increases the range of monitoring granularity that can
be provided via hardware-based mechanisms. This allows the primitives to provide
security policy compliance monitoring in a broad range of computing environments,
rather than being limited to a single computing environment.
6.2 Future Work
We have determined a number of capabilities that can be provided by the con-
cepts proposed in this research, but that are outside the scope of our primary research
goals. As a result, there are a number of areas we would like to explore in future re-
search efforts. These ares are described below.
6.2.1 Virtual Memory Introspection Implementation. The platform thata
was used for prototyping our systems can implement both PowerPC 405 processors
and Xilinx Microblaze processors. The PowerPC cores contain an MMU, however
they are hardcores and cannot be modified. The Microblaze cores, are softcores,
hence they are modifiable, however they do not contain an MMU of their own. As
a result, we were not able to implement our co-opted MMU or SMU with multiple
MMUs concepts presented in Sections 3.5.4.2 and 3.5.4.3, respectively. Implementing
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such capabilities would greatly benefit from having access to a softcore processor that
contains an MMU. This leaves two options: 1) Gain access to the source code for the
Microblaze processor and modify it to include an MMU, or 2) use a softcore processor
that contains an MMU.
As the Microblaze is based on a Harvard architecture, Option 1 above may be
more difficult as there are separate data and instruction buses. Option 2, however,
may be able to be realized with the Leon3 softcore processor. As mentioned in Section
4.2.1.3, the Leon 3 is a softcore processor with an MMU. As a result, it may be
possible to use the Leon3 processor to prototype our MMU co-opting and multiple
MMU concepts.
6.2.2 Enhanced Debug Registers. Contemporary processors include registers
that are used to monitor a number of memory addresses for debugging purposes. De-
bug registers can typically monitor both addresses and data and can be set to trigger
on varying conditions. As such, this kind of capability may be useful for security
related monitoring tasks. For example, a breakpoint could be set for a particular
address containing a key invariant. The debug registers could then be used to trigger
a signal when the memory address is accessed. Rather than halting the processor,
the triggered breakpoint could be used to signal the SMU to notify it of the event
and have it perform an invariant check. Adding this enhanced debug capability would
most likely not be very difficult as it would consist mostly of tapping into the memory
bus, which we have already shown to work in Section 4.4.2.
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Additionally, many processor architectures only contain a small number of debug
registers (Intel processors have four [26]), however, if using such a capability for
security-related monitoring rather than debugging, it may be desired to have more
of these registers. Instead, 25 or so could be implemented to allow for monitoring a
large number of events that would indicate malicious activity. By doing this, the SMU
would respond to specific events as they happen, rather than periodically checking a
number of locations to see if an invariant has changed. Moreover, these debug registers
could be enhanced to monitor a range of addresses, rather than just a single address.
This would be beneficial as one could monitor over a broad range of addresses, making
it more likely that the event will be detected. This could possibly be helpful for either
detecting previously unencountered malicious activity or for malicious activity that
does not always work on the same memory address.
6.2.3 Forensics Capabilities. The various memory introspection methods
provide for visibility into both the physical and virtual memory spaces. While the
primary goal of such a capability is real-time monitoring of key invariants in order
to detect illegitimate activity, it also could provide a convenient platform for data
forensics capabilities. As such, key portions of monitored code can not only be mon-
itored, but stored as well. This information could then be used at a later time to
analyze attacks and find security holes within the monitored process. This can be ex-
tended to include state information gathered from other system resources other than
memory such as the PC or the process’ PID. Correlating this state information with
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data gathered from a monitored process’ memory may be able to provide for forensics
capabilities not currently available.
6.2.4 Automatic Process Repair. While our memory introspection tech-
niques focus on reading the state of a process’ memory space (physical and virtual)
in hardware, these memory introspection primitives provide the ability to write to
a process’ memory space as well. This could potentially be used for repairing pro-
cesses in the event that they are damaged from an attack. As we are monitoring
state information in realtime, it may even be possible to detect and repair such dam-
age automatically, providing a powerful self-healing capability in real-time. An SMU
containing multiple MMUs, as was presented in Sections 3.5.4.3 and 4.4.6, would be
particularly suited to such a capability since process damage could be repaired and de-
tected while a process resides on the ready, I/O, or waiting queues. However, writing
to a monitored process’ memory space can be dangerous for the monitored process,
as a completely separate process (executing on the SMU) can potentially damage the
monitored process if done incorrectly. As a result, care must be taken so as to not
further damage the monitored process.
6.2.5 Minimum Required Resource Investigation. The implementation of
our primitives was done as a proof of concept. As such, we did not look at resource
usage in terms of area, power, etc. Thus, the primitives are probably using more
resources than are required for the tasks they perform. For example, the SMU may
not need a powerful processor to perform memory introspection. Thus it would be
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interesting to investigate the minimum resource requirements for each capability to
improve efficiency. This would help when integrating our concepts into commercial
designs as chip-area is at a premium. As there are current efforts to move dedicated
coprocessing tasks to the CPU packaging and eventually onto the core itself with
AMD’s Torrenza initiative [44], our security primitives could be one such form of
coprocessing. Moreover, a small portion of a processor could include FPGA fabric to
allow our primitives to be configured directly on the CPU and tailored to a specific
application. Such an application would greatly benefit from determining how such
concepts can be implemented while using resources efficiently.
6.2.6 Scalability: Multiple PPUs per SMU. The architecture we propose
currently allows for one SMU monitoring each PPU in the system. However, the
PPU may not always be executing a monitored process, leaving the SMU unused. As
a result, the SMU may be able to use its resources to monitor other PPUs within
the system that may be executing a monitored process. Having a single SMU service
multiple PPUs would be a more efficient use of resources and serve to minimize the
chip area devoted to SMUs, allowing for more chip resources to be devoted to the
PPUs. While the SMU could potentially be switched to only work with one PPU at a
time, it may be possible for a single SMU to service multiple PPUs simultaneously, so
long as the required hardware primitives are orthogonal to each other. For example,
the PC monitor could be monitoring one PPU, while the memory introspection tasks
could be performed on another PPU. The focus of such research would be the inter-
143
connection method between the PPUs and the SMU, as well as the software model of
the SMU itself.
6.2.7 Security Logic Units. Microprocessors are already moving toward
multicore designs and there seem to be no end in sight with Sun Microsystem’s Ultra-
SPARC T1 processor having 8 cores now [54]. Additionally, recent research conducted
by Intel has produced what they are terming as “Tera-scale processors” [21]. These
processors further the current multicore paradigm by integrating a large number (80
cores for the tera-scale prototype) of simple cores in order to increase performance.
All of these cores would need some form of security monitoring, therefore, it may be
possible to abstract away the concept of an SMU, and make each primitive into a type
of security logical unit (SLU) that focuses on a particular type of data processing.
The entire processor would have access to a number of each kind of SLU, similar to
how processor pipelines today have access to a number of multipliers, adders, etc.
Depending on the code executing on the particular core, it could use whatever SLUs
are needed at the particular time for SPCM purposes. Reconfigurable logic could even
be used to provide for varying types and numbers of SLUs depending on the current
application being monitored. This organization of security resources would make it
difficult for the monitoring primitives to remain transparent to the processing cores
being monitored, thus new hardware-based mechanisms would most likely need to be
proposed that could ensure the security and proper operation of the SLUs.
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Appendix A. Implementation Code
A.1 Execution Policy Enforcement Module
A.1.1 MB Trace4mdm top.vhd.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- Created by: 2Lt Stephen Mott, USAF
-- Create Date: 13:23:25 02/06/2007
-- Design Name: Execution Policy Enforcement Module
-- Module Name: MB_Trace4mdm_top
-- Project Name: mbtrace4projmdm.ise
-- Target Devices: XilinxML310 development board
-- Tool versions: 8.2i
--
-- Description: This is the top-level structural definition of our
-- execution policy enforcement system. It connects
-- the non-executable memory table (noex_mem) and the
-- non-executable memory enable logic (noex_mem_en)
-- to the embedded system containing the PPU (i.e. a
-- microblaze processor) that was created in EDK.
--
-- Dependencies: This module requires the use of the
-- system.xmp from the mb_trace4_int_mdm_test EDK
-- project. Also required are the noex_mem_en.vhd
-- and noex_mem.xco modules.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
library IEEE; use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.ALL; use
IEEE.STD_LOGIC_ARITH.ALL; use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_UNSIGNED.ALL; entity
MB_Trace4mdm_top is --these are pins that connect to signals on the
ML310 board itself PORT(
fpga_0_RS232_Uart_RX_pin : IN std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CLK_pin : IN std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPIRQ_pin : IN std_logic;
sys_clk_pin : IN std_logic;
sys_rst_pin : IN std_logic;
fpga_0_LEDs_8Bit_GPIO_IO_pin : INOUT std_logic_vector(0 to 7);
fpga_0_LCD_OPTIONAL_GPIO_IO_pin : INOUT std_logic_vector(0 to 11);
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPD_pin : INOUT std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
fpga_0_RS232_Uart_TX_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_clk_enable_n_pin : OUT std_logic;
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fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPA_pin : OUT std_logic_vector(6 downto 0);
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CEN_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_OEN_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_WEN_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_1_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_2_pin : OUT std_logic);
end MB_Trace4mdm_top;
--component definitions
architecture Structural of MB_Trace4mdm_top is
--this defines the inputs and outputs of the microblaze system
created in the EDK COMPONENT system PORT(
fpga_0_RS232_Uart_RX_pin : IN std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CLK_pin : IN std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPIRQ_pin : IN std_logic;
sys_clk_pin : IN std_logic;
sys_rst_pin : IN std_logic;
microblaze_0_INTERRUPT_pin : IN std_logic;
sys_clk_s_pin : IN std_logic;
fpga_0_LEDs_8Bit_GPIO_IO_pin : INOUT std_logic_vector(0 to 7);
fpga_0_LCD_OPTIONAL_GPIO_IO_pin : INOUT std_logic_vector(0 to 11);
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPD_pin : INOUT std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
fpga_0_RS232_Uart_TX_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_clk_enable_n_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPA_pin : OUT std_logic_vector(6 downto 0);
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CEN_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_OEN_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_WEN_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_1_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_2_pin : OUT std_logic;
system_clk_pin : OUT std_logic;
microblaze_0_Trace_PC_pin : OUT std_logic_vector(0 to 31));
END COMPONENT;
--these are the pins of the no-ex_mem module
component noex_mem
port (
clka: IN std_logic;
addra: IN std_logic_VECTOR(14 downto 0);
ena: IN std_logic;
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douta: OUT std_logic_VECTOR(0 downto 0));
end component;
-- FPGA Express Black Box declaration for creating the noex_mem
module attribute fpga_dont_touch: string; attribute fpga_dont_touch
of noex_mem: component is "true";
-- Synplicity black box declaration for creating the noex_mem module
attribute syn_black_box : boolean; attribute syn_black_box of
noex_mem: component is true;
--these are the pins of the no-ex_mem_en module COMPONENT
noex_mem_en PORT(
CLK : IN std_logic;
PC_in : IN std_logic_vector(31 downto 15);
Enable : OUT std_logic);
END COMPONENT;
--signals for connecting instantiated components signal CLOCK :
STD_LOGIC; signal MB_INT : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(0 DOWNTO 0); signal
PC_BITS : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR(31 DOWNTO 0); signal ENABLE_MEM :
STD_LOGIC;
begin --the different components are instantiated and connected below
--instantiation and port mapping of the
--embedded system created using the EDK
system_i: system PORT MAP(
fpga_0_RS232_Uart_RX_pin => fpga_0_RS232_Uart_RX_pin,
fpga_0_RS232_Uart_TX_pin => fpga_0_RS232_Uart_TX_pin,
fpga_0_LEDs_8Bit_GPIO_IO_pin => fpga_0_LEDs_8Bit_GPIO_IO_pin,
fpga_0_LCD_OPTIONAL_GPIO_IO_pin => fpga_0_LCD_OPTIONAL_GPIO_IO_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CLK_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CLK_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_clk_enable_n_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_clk_enable_n_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPA_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPA_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPD_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPD_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CEN_pin =>
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fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CEN_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_OEN_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_OEN_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_WEN_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_WEN_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPIRQ_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPIRQ_pin,
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_pin => fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_pin,
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_1_pin => fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_1_pin,
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_2_pin => fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_2_pin,
sys_clk_pin => sys_clk_pin,
sys_rst_pin => sys_rst_pin,
microblaze_0_INTERRUPT_pin => MB_INT(0),
system_clk_pin => CLOCK,
sys_clk_s_pin => CLOCK,
microblaze_0_Trace_PC_pin => PC_BITS);
--instantiation and port mapping of the --noex_mem module
noex_mem_module : noex_mem
port map (
clka => CLOCK,
addra => PC_BITS(14 DOWNTO 0),
ena => ENABLE_MEM,
douta => MB_INT);
--instantiation and port mapping of the --noex_mem_en module
noex_mem_en_module : noex_mem_en PORT MAP(
CLK => CLOCK,
PC_in => PC_BITS(31 DOWNTO 15),
Enable => ENABLE_MEM);
end Structural;
A.1.2 noex mem en.vhd.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- Created By: 2Lt Stephen Mott, USAF
-- Create Date: 13:37:46 02/06/2007
-- Design Name: Execution Policy Enforcement Module
-- Module Name: noex_mem_en_module - Behavioral
-- Project Name: mbtrace4projmdm.ise
-- Target Devices: XilinxML310 development board
-- Tool versions: 8.2i
--
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-- Description: This module is a behavioral definition of the enable
-- logic for the noex_mem module. As it may be
-- desired that only certain regions of memory may
-- want to be monitored, we created this enable logic
-- to allow monitoring to only occur for particular
-- memory addresses. Thus, any PC within the range,
-- will activate the monitor(i.e. the noex_mem BRAM).
-- Our enable logic currently provides for program
-- counter values below 0x00008000 to enable the
-- noex_mem module.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
library IEEE;
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.ALL;
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_ARITH.ALL;
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_UNSIGNED.ALL;
entity noex_mem_en is
Port (
CLK : in STD_LOGIC; --clock signal input
PC_in : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (31 downto 15); --upper 17 bits of
--the microblaze PC
Enable : out STD_LOGIC); --enable signal output
end noex_mem_en;
architecture Behavioral of noex_mem_en is
begin
process(CLK)
begin
if(PC_in = "00000000000000000") then --sets enable signal if PC is below
Enable <= ’1’; --address 0x00008000.
else
Enable <= ’0’;
end if;
end process;
end Behavioral;
A.2 Multi-context Hardware Monitoring
A.2.1 MB PID2 top.vhd.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- Created By: 2Lt Stephen Mott, USAF
-- Create Date: 09:01:53 01/24/2007
-- Design Name: Multi-context hardware monitoring
-- Module Name: MB_PID2_top - MB_PID2_Struct
-- Project Name: MB_PID2.ise
-- Target Devices: Xilinx ML310 development board
-- Tool versions: 8.2i
-- Description: This is the top-level structural definition of our Multi-context
-- monitors system. It connects the PID retrieval logic to the
-- embedded system that contains the PPU (i.e. a microblaze
-- processor).
--
-- Dependencies: requires the system.xmp file in the MB_PID2 EDK project and the
-- PID_Logic.vhd file.
--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
library IEEE;
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.ALL;
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_ARITH.ALL;
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_UNSIGNED.ALL;
entity MB_PID2_top is
--these are pins that connect to signals on the ML310 board itself
PORT(
fpga_0_RS232_Uart_RX_pin : IN std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CLK_pin : IN std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPIRQ_pin : IN std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_CLK_FB : IN std_logic;
sys_clk_pin : IN std_logic;
sys_rst_pin : IN std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_DQS_pin :
INOUT std_logic_vector(0 to 3);
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_DQ_pin :
INOUT std_logic_vector(0 to 31);
fpga_0_LEDs_8Bit_GPIO_IO_pin :
INOUT std_logic_vector(0 to 7);
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPD_pin :
INOUT std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_Clk_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_Clkn_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_Addr_pin :
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OUT std_logic_vector(0 to 12);
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_BankAddr_pin :
OUT std_logic_vector(0 to 1);
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_CASn_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_CKE_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_CSn_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_RASn_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_WEn_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_DM_pin : OUT std_logic_vector(0 to 3);
fpga_0_RS232_Uart_TX_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_clk_enable_n_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPA_pin :
OUT std_logic_vector(6 downto 0);
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CEN_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_OEN_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_WEN_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_1_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_2_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_CLK_FB_OUT : OUT std_logic);
end MB_PID2_top;
--component definitions
architecture MB_PID2_Struct of MB_PID2_top is
--this defines the inputs and outputs of the microblaze system created in the EDK
COMPONENT system
PORT(
fpga_0_RS232_Uart_RX_pin : IN std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CLK_pin : IN std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPIRQ_pin : IN std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_CLK_FB : IN std_logic;
sys_clk_pin : IN std_logic;
sys_rst_pin : IN std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_DQS_pin :
INOUT std_logic_vector(0 to 3);
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_DQ_pin :
INOUT std_logic_vector(0 to 31);
fpga_0_LEDs_8Bit_GPIO_IO_pin : INOUT std_logic_vector(0 to 7);
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPD_pin :
INOUT std_logic_vector(7 downto 0);
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_Clk_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_Clkn_pin : OUT std_logic;
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fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_Addr_pin :
OUT std_logic_vector(0 to 12);
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_BankAddr_pin :
OUT std_logic_vector(0 to 1);
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_CASn_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_CKE_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_CSn_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_RASn_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_WEn_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_DM_pin : OUT std_logic_vector(0 to 3);
fpga_0_RS232_Uart_TX_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_clk_enable_n_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPA_pin :
OUT std_logic_vector(6 downto 0);
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CEN_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_OEN_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_WEN_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_1_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_2_pin : OUT std_logic;
fpga_0_DDR_CLK_FB_OUT : OUT std_logic;
--the below pins are the pins used for our external logic to
--tap into the embedded system created in the EDK
Int_ProcessA_pin : IN std_logic; --Interrupt for PID A
Int_ProcessB_pin : IN std_logic; --Interrupt for PID B
CLK_OUT_pin : OUT std_logic; --system Clock
RST_OUT_pin : OUT std_logic; --system reset
OPB_RNW_pin : OUT std_logic; --OPB read/write signal
OPB_ABus_pin : OUT std_logic_vector(0 to 31); --OPB address lines
OPB_DBus_pin : OUT std_logic_vector(0 to 31); --OPB data lines
Trace_PC_pin : OUT std_logic_vector(0 to 31)); --microblaze program counter
END COMPONENT;
--this defines the inputs and outputs of the logic used to retrieve the PID
COMPONENT PID_LOGIC
PORT(
ADDR_IN : IN std_logic_vector(0 to 31);
DATA_IN : IN std_logic_vector(0 to 31);
RNW_IN : IN std_logic;
CLK_IN : IN std_logic;
RST_IN : IN std_logic;
INT_A_OUT : OUT std_logic;
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INT_B_OUT : OUT std_logic);
END COMPONENT;
--connection signals for instantiated components
SIGNAL CLOCK : std_logic;
SIGNAL INT_A : std_logic;
SIGNAL INT_B : std_logic;
SIGNAL ADDR : std_logic_vector(0 to 31);
SIGNAL DATA : std_logic_vector(0 to 31);
SIGNAL RESET : std_logic;
SIGNAL RNW : std_logic;
begin --the different components are instantiated and connected below
--instantiation and port mapping of the
--embedded system created using the EDK
system_i : system
PORT MAP(
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_Clk_pin =>
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_Clk_pin,
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_Clkn_pin =>
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_Clkn_pin,
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_Addr_pin =>
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_Addr_pin,
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_BankAddr_pin =>
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_BankAddr_pin,
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_CASn_pin =>
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_CASn_pin,
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_CKE_pin =>
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_CKE_pin,
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_CSn_pin =>
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_CSn_pin,
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_RASn_pin =>
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_RASn_pin,
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_WEn_pin =>
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_WEn_pin,
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_DM_pin =>
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_DM_pin,
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_DQS_pin =>
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_DQS_pin,
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_DQ_pin =>
fpga_0_DDR_SDRAM_32Mx64_DDR_DQ_pin,
fpga_0_RS232_Uart_RX_pin => fpga_0_RS232_Uart_RX_pin,
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fpga_0_RS232_Uart_TX_pin => fpga_0_RS232_Uart_TX_pin,
fpga_0_LEDs_8Bit_GPIO_IO_pin => fpga_0_LEDs_8Bit_GPIO_IO_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CLK_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CLK_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_clk_enable_n_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_clk_enable_n_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPA_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPA_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPD_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPD_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CEN_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_CEN_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_OEN_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_OEN_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_WEN_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_WEN_pin,
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPIRQ_pin =>
fpga_0_SysACE_CompactFlash_SysACE_MPIRQ_pin,
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_pin => fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_pin,
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_1_pin => fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_1_pin,
fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_2_pin => fpga_0_ORGate_1_Res_2_pin,
fpga_0_DDR_CLK_FB => fpga_0_DDR_CLK_FB,
fpga_0_DDR_CLK_FB_OUT => fpga_0_DDR_CLK_FB_OUT,
sys_clk_pin => sys_clk_pin,
sys_rst_pin => sys_rst_pin,
Int_ProcessA_pin => INT_A,
Int_ProcessB_pin => INT_B,
CLK_OUT_pin => CLOCK,
RST_OUT_pin => RESET,
OPB_RNW_pin => RNW,
OPB_ABus_pin => ADDR,
OPB_DBus_pin => DATA,
Trace_PC_pin => open); --"Trace_PC_pin" is included to provide for
--the connection of monitoring logic that may be
--added to this project in the future. Currently,
--it is left unconnected.
--instantiation and port mapping of the
--PID retrieval logic
PID_LOGIC_inst : PID_LOGIC
PORT MAP(
ADDR_IN => ADDR,
DATA_IN => DATA,
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RNW_IN => RNW,
CLK_IN => CLOCK,
RST_IN => RESET,
INT_A_OUT => INT_A,
INT_B_OUT => INT_B);
end MB_PID2_Struct;
A.2.2 PID LOGIC.vhd.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- Created by: 2Lt Stephen Mott, USAF
-- Create Date: 14:10:33 01/24/2007
-- Design Name: Multi-context Hardware Monitoring
-- Module Name: PID_LOGIC - PID_LOGIC_Struct
-- Project Name: MB_PID2.ise
-- Target Devices: ML310 development board
-- Tool versions: 8.2i
--
-- Description: This module is a behavioral definition of the operation of the
-- logic that captures the
-- the PID from the PPU. When the PID is captured it is compared to
-- see if it matches one of the "stored" PIDs. If a match occurs,
-- then the corresponding interrupt signal is triggered. This module
-- only can output two different interrupts, so only two different
-- contexts can be monitored. This is not only a limitation of how we
-- have coded this module, but also a limitation on we have
-- implemented the embedded system in EDK (i.e. we designed the
-- interrupt controller to allow only 2 interrupts. If the PID does
-- not match one of the "stored" PIDs, then no interrupt is
-- triggered. This logic also stores the current PID, so subsequent
-- accesses to other memory addresses will not affect the captured
-- PID of the of the "currently executing process". The PIDs that
-- trigger the interrupts can be changed by changing the "pid1" and
-- "pid2" variables.
--
-- Dependencies: This file is required by MB_PID2_top.vhd module in the
-- MB_PID2.ise project
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
library IEEE;
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.ALL;
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_ARITH.ALL;
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_UNSIGNED.ALL;
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entity PID_LOGIC is
PORT(
ADDR_IN : IN std_logic_vector(0 to 31); --OPB address lines
DATA_IN : IN std_logic_vector(0 to 31); --OPB data lines
RNW_IN : IN std_logic; --OPB read/write signal
CLK_IN : IN std_logic; --system clock
RST_IN : IN std_logic; --system reset
INT_A_OUT : OUT std_logic; --PID A interrupt
INT_B_OUT : OUT std_logic --PID B interrupt
);
end PID_LOGIC;
architecture PID_LOGIC_Behavior of PID_LOGIC is
SIGNAL DATA_VAL : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
SIGNAL COMP_VAL : std_logic_vector( 1 downto 0);
begin
Capture : Process(RST_IN, CLK_IN, RNW_IN)
--address where the PID resides in memory
VARIABLE pid_addr : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := X"30000001";
--temp storage for the PID on the OPB data bus
VARIABLE pid_val : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := X"00000000";
--PID of the first process to be monitored
VARIABLE pid1 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := X"30001000";
--PID of the second process to be monitored
VARIABLE pid2 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := X"30002000";
Begin
IF (RST_IN = ’0’)
THEN
pid_VAL := X"00000000";
INT_A_OUT <= ’0’;
INT_B_OUT <= ’0’;
ELSIF (CLK_IN = ’1’ AND CLK_IN’LAST_VALUE = ’0’ AND RNW_IN = ’0’ AND
ADDR_IN = pid_addr)
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THEN
pid_val := DATA_IN; --captures PID if a PID is written to memory
END IF;
--interrupt control logic
IF (pid_val = pid1) then --triggers interrupt A if PID matches pid1
INT_A_OUT <= ’1’;
INT_B_OUT <= ’0’;
ELSIF (pid_val = pid2) then --triggers interrupt B if PID matches pid2
INT_A_OUT <= ’0’;
INT_B_OUT <= ’1’;
ELSE
INT_A_OUT <= ’0’; --no interrupts triggered if PID does not match
INT_B_OUT <= ’0’; --pid1 or pid2
END IF;
End process Capture;
end PID_LOGIC_Behavior;
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Appendix B. Development Software Tutorials
B.1 Embedded Linux Tutorial
This section presents a guide for creating a relatively simple embedded design
using the XUPV2P development board and the Xilinx development environment (ver-
sion 8.1i). We will discuss preparing the the environment, creating a reference system
using the Xilinx Base System Builder, using Platform Studio to modify the design,
and using a CF card to load code when turning the system on. The goal of this
section is to provide the basic knowledge needed to create, modify, and implement
an embedded design quickly in order to familiarize the reader with the development
environment. If any problems are encountered that the Tutorial or Troubleshooting
sections do not cover, please refer to [63,64].
B.1.1 Initializing The Environment. The first thing that must be done
is to make sure that all the required software tools are present. Both Xilinx ISE
Foundation 8.1i and EDK 8.1i must be installed on a Windows XP-based machine.
Although it is probably not necessary, it is also a good idea to download the most
recent IPCores updates and service packs. These can be found at the Xilinx website.
Finally, the design repository that comes with the XUPV2P board must be copied
to any location on the hardrive. The repository files are responsible for making the
Xilinx software aware of all of the features of the XUPV2P development board so
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that they can be configured. The repository directory can be found on the CD that
came with the XUPV2P.
B.1.2 The Base System Builder. The Base System Builder, known as the
BSB hereafter, is a design tool that is part of the EDK Platform Studio which provides
a quick, semi-automated method for creating and implementing embedded designs.
The BSB has certain limitations, however, that prevent it from being able to create
multi-processor designs and adding additional IPCores to a design. This limitation
will be addressed in the next section. Despite such limitations, the BSB provides a
convenient and efficient means to build a working reference embedded design that can
later be built upon.
In order to access the BSB, you must run the EDK Platform Studio. This can
be found under the EDK directory of the Windows “Start” menu. Upon starting
Platform Studio, you will be greeted with a prompt asking what you would like
to do. You can use the BSB, create a blank project, or open an already existing
project. Select “Base System Builder wizard” and click “OK”. A prompt will be
displayed asking where you would like to save the EDK project file and if you would
like to include a design repository. Choose a desired path and project name to store
your project information, making sure there are no spaces in the path name as this
can cause problems later when trying to implement your design. Also select the
”Use Repository Paths” checkbox and point the BSB to the “lib” folder within the
directory you copied the XUPV2P repository files to earlier. The next window asks if
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you would like to create a new design or open an exiting .bsb design. Select the create
new design option. A menu will then open asking what the target development board
is. Use the dropdown menus to choose the Xilinx XUP Virtex-II Pro Development
System Revision C board and click “Next”.
The next several menus are used to choose what components of the development
board you would like to implement in your design. Select the check boxes for the
following components and use defaults unless otherwise stated:
• 1. PowerPC Core (w/ Cache Setup Enabled)
• 2. RS232 Uart 1
• 3. SysACE CompactFlash 1 (use interrupt)
• 3. LEDs 4Bit
• 4 DIPSWs 4Bit
• 5. PushButtons 5Bit
• 6. DDR RAM corresponding to your hardware configuration
• 7. plb bram if cntlr 1 (128KB)
Once the hardware components have been chosen, you can choose 2 tests to in-
clude in your design: 1) a memory test and 2) a peripheral selftest. Select both tests
as you will be able to choose which test to implement later. Also select RS232 Uart 1
from both the STDIN and STDOUT dropdown menus and then click “Next”. The
next prompt will allow you to configure what memory location on the development
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board your programs will be run from. For the memory test, select the plb bramif cntlr 1
for all dropdown menus. For the peripheral test, select DDR SDRAM .˙. if you have
installed RAM, or plb bram if cntlr 1 if you are not using RAM. Click “Next”.
A summary of the components and their corresponding addresses you have
added o your design will be displayed. Look this over and make sure you made
no mistakes, selecting “Back” if you have to change anything. When done, select
“Generate”. Now is a tricky part. If you select the Platform Studio window and look
at the Console Window at the bottom of the screen, you will see numerous “Unknown
DIR value UNKNOWN” errors in the *.mhs file. This must be fixed before you select
”Finish”. In order to do this, navigate to the directory where you saved the project file
to earlier. This directory now contains number of new directories and configuration
files to tell the EDK how to create the bitstream that will be used to configure the
FPGA based on the components you selected earlier. Open the system.mhs file using
a simple text editor like notepad. Towards the top of the .mhs file there will be 7
“PORT” variables with the “DIR” attribute initialized to “UNKNOWN”. Comment
out these lines of code by placing a “#” at the beginning of each line and save the
file and exit. Now go back to the BSB wizard and select “Finish”. The required files
will then be checked for errors and a new menu will open giving you a choice of what
to do next. Make sure that the development board is powered on and the the USB
cable connecting the board to the windows box is connected. Select the “Download
the design to the board and test it” option. This will synthesize the design, build the
161
memory test, and then download them to the board. This may take anywhere from
5 to 10 minutes depending on your system.
Now that the design has been created and downloaded to the board it is time
to see if it works. Use a serial cable to connect the board’s serial port to the machine
with Platforma Studio on it. Open a hyperterminal window and configure it to 9600
baud, 8 data bits, no parity, 1 stop bit, no flow control, and to the serial ports COM
port. Press the restart button on the board. If all goes well you should see something
in the hyperterminal window. If using RAM, you should see a number of tests. If
the any result of these test failed, you either selected the wrong RAM option when
configuring your design or you need to try using different RAM. If you are not using
RAM, and hence are using plb bram if cntlr 1, all you should see is “entering main”
followed by “exiting main”. This is because you cannot test the memory where the
memory test is actually residing.
B.1.3 Platform Studio. Platform Studio is the heart of the development
environment. Once the BSB has been completed, the Platform Studio interface will
be updated to reflect your project. On the left side of Platform studio are three
tabs: Project, Applications, and IP Catalog. The project tab lists the project files,
general options, and reference files. These should not need to be altered in any way.
The applications tab displays which programs are associated with your project and
allows you to select which program to load to the board, view source code, and modify
program attributes like the linker script which will be important later. The IP catalog
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conveniently lists all of the IP cores that can be loaded into a design and allows you
to do so.
The right window of Platform Studio is your main view window. This is where
your system assembly and overall block diagram of your design can be viewed. The
system assembly tab provides information on how all of the IPcores are linked together
to form your design. You can view this from the bus interface, port, or memory address
perspectives by selecting the appropriate radio button at the top of the tab. You can
modify names, links, and hardware addresses in these perspectives as well. The block
diagram will not be displayed until your design has been compiled. The block diagram
just serves as a convenient means to see your design’s configuration. You should take
a moment to explore the Platform Studio GUI in order to familiarize yourself with it.
In order to run the peripheral selftest, it must be selected as the application
to run and be compiled. To do this, click on the “Applications” tab. Right click
on the TestApp Memory project and uncheck “Mark to initial BRAMs”. Next, right
click on the TestApp Peripheral and select “Mark to initialize BRAMs”. This will set
the peripheral selftest as the project to download to the board. If using RAM, right
click on “TestApp Perpheral” and select “Build Project”. If using plb bram if cntlr 1
then right click “TestApp Peripheral” and select “Set Compiler Options”. Under the
“Environment” tab in the window that pops up, select the “Use default Linker Script”
checkbox. Set the Program start address to “0x00000200”, and the stack and the heap
sizes both to “400” and click “OK”. Now right click the peripheral selftest project and
select “Build Project”. Check the console window to ensure that there were no errors
163
during build. Now select the “Device Configuration” menu at the top of the Platform
Studio Window and choose “Download Bitstream”. When it is done downloading,
go back to your hyperterminal and press the reset button on the development board.
You should see a tests for the SysACE, LEDS, etc. All test should pass except for
the SysACE since a CF card is not plugged in. Also, you can change the dipswitch
configuration and hold the push-buttons on the development board while resetting
the development board to see different values returned during the selftest.
B.1.4 Compact Flash and SysACE. While a compact flash card is not
required to get an embedded system up and running, using one has many advantages
but doing so is not necessarily straightforward. First, the XUPV2P board is very
particular about the file system of the CF card, thus it must be properly formatted.
In order to do this, a Windows version of mkdosfs.exe is needed. This can be found
easily by doing an internet search. After downloading mkdosfs.exe, place it in an
easily accessible directory. Make sure the CF card is attached to the machine using a
CF card reader. Open a dos command prompt and navigate to directory containing
mkdosfs.exe and type the following command:
“mkdosfs -s 64 -F 16 -R 1 X:”
where X: is the drive letter of the compact flash card. This will format the CF card
using a FAT16 filesystem with 64 sectors per cluster and 1 reserved sector.
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Now that the CF card is ready, the SysACE file that will go on the CF card is
to be generated. First the GenACE.opt file must be created. Create a new document
in notepad and enter the following:
-jprog
-board user
-target ppc hw
-hw implementation/download.bit
-elf TestApp Peripheral/executable.elf
-configdevice devicenr 1 idcode0x1127e093 irlength 14 partname xc2vp30
-debugdevice devicenr 1cpunr 1
-ace system.ace
Save the file as “GenACE.opt” in the project directory. Next, open a cygwin shell
by selecting the “Launch EDK shell.˙.” from the “Project” dropdown menu in Plat-
form studio. In the shell, navigate to your project directory and type the following
command:
“xmd -tcl genace.tcl -opt GenACE.opt”
This will cerate a file named system.ace in the project directory. Copy this file to
the CF card that was formatted earlier and insert it into the CF card slot on the
development board (make sure the power is off). Now turn the board on. If all has
gone correctly, the ACE LED on the board should be solid green, rather than blinking
red. Also, the peripheral selftest should have executed with similar results to when it
was run previously. The only difference should be that the SysACE test will now be
passed.
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B.2 Troubleshooting
In this section we cover the problems that were encountered over the course of our
development thus far. Although this is not meant to be all inclusive, it is a convenient
place to begin to find a solution, and it may shed some light on a similar problem you
may be encountering.
B.2.1 Development Environment.
• Q1. Why does the BSB return an error when I try to tell it where to store the
project?
• A1. While the BSB asks for a directory, you must also provide a name for your
EDK project. Also, remember to make sure that the filename and path do not
have any spaces in them.
• Q2. I just recompiled my software and now it freezes in the middle of execution.
What should I do?
• A2. This can especially be if a problem if you chose to store your program in
BRAM. Make sure that your linker is set to use the ”default linker script” and
that the program start address is above 0x00000100 to avoid overriding the in-
terrupt vector jump table. Also, since BRAM is at 128KB at its maximum, its
addresses ranges from 0x00000000 to 0x00020000. Thus make certain that the
size of your stack and heap are small enough to not exceed the 128KB limit after
you account for your program size. Note: Depending on how you configured
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your board, you may have less than 128KB of BRAM, so keep track of your
memory address range accordingly.
• Q3. Why can’t I generate a system.ace file? It keeps exiting on an error. /item
A3. make sure that there are no spaces in any of your paths to files that may
be being used by the system ace utility. This includes the ”My Documents”
folder, so you can not use that to store your project information.
• Q4. The BSB returns an error when I try to ”Finish” the wizard. What can I
do?
• A4. For some reason, when using the XUPV2P development board and the
BSB, it will try to initialize some variables within the project’s .mhs file that
are not there. This causes the .mhs file to cause the final build script to crash.
Thus, before clicking ”Finish” in the BSB, open the .mhs file in your projects
directory, and comment out the lines causing the problem. To figure out what
lines you need to comment, check the Console Window of the Platform Studio.
This window should report what lines are causing the problem.
B.2.2 General Linux.
• Q1. When running certain commands in linux, I get a permission denied mes-
sage. What should I do?
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• A1. This error is due to your permissions in linux. There are a number of
commands that can change either the folder permissions - such as chmod, chgrp,
and chown - or your user’s permission level - such as gpasswd. Information on
all such commands can easily be found on the internet. Experiment with these
commands to learn them as they will all be very handy. Alternatively, you can
use the “su-” command to switch to root privileges if you have root access, but
this can be dangerous. You must be a member of group “wheel”s to be able to
do this.
B.2.3 Embedded Linux Installation.
• Q1. While creating the crosscompiler the command shell returns an error when
using the “setenv” command.
• A1. This depends on the shell you are using. Replace “setenv” with “export”.
• Q2. When trying to download the Linux sources using bitmover, I get an error
saying that it cannot find sfio.sh. I see a sfio.sh in the bitmover directory,
however. What should I do?
• A2. you need to temporarily add your bitmover directory to your execution
path. This can be done by typing, “PATH=¡bitmover directory path¿:$PATH”,
in the console.
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• Q3. When I try to run the mkrootfs.sh script, all the directories are created,
but no system programs have been installed. Why is busy box not working?
• A3. The problem is not with busybox itself; it is with the script. The mk-
rootfs.sh script has a busy box directory variable about 80to where you have
installed busybox to.
• Q4. I just formatted and partitioned my CF card and put the .ace file and root
file system on it. Now linux won’t boot up at all at system power-on anymore.
• A4. As the XUPV2P is particular about how the CF card is partitioned, the
fdisk formatter messed it when you made the boot partition. To fix this, first,
with all three partitions still on the CF card, use the process from the Tutorial
section to format the card. The go back into fdsk on the linux box and create
the swap and root partitions again. Make sure not to use fdsik to make the
boot partition. Do, however, make the boot partition as bootable. Now copy
the root filesystem back onto the root partition. Place the CF card in the CF
card slot and power the system on.
• Q5. Linux starts and a login prompt appears. When I try to login as root, it
returns me back to another login prompt.
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• A5. Make sure that the force dedicated serial console in the busybox config is
not selected. Also, make sure that you have chosen a shell (the ash shell is very
close to the bash shell) in the busybox config.
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